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This thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter examines the impact of monetary 
policy shocks on disaggregated loans from conventional and Islamic banks in Malaysia by 
employing Factor Augmented VAR (FAVAR). The results suggest that expansionary 
monetary policy reduces output, price level, and bank lending. The results validate the role 
of Islamic banks in the monetary transmission mechanism and show that loans from Islamic 
banks are more responsive to monetary policy shocks compared to conventional loans. We 
also found strong heterogeneity across sectors and purposes loans from these two types of 
banks. 
The second chapter examines the effects of credit supply shocks on the economy of Malaysia 
by using Bayesian SVAR approach and implementing the sign restrictions to identify the 
shocks.  We found that expansionary credit supply shock increases GDP growth, inflation, 
lending growth, and policy rate and does have substantial importance in explaining the 
forecast variance of macroeconomics variables in Malaysia. We further breaking down the 
loans to its components: households and non-financial corporations and found some 
differences of the responses and differences on the relative importance of credit supply shocks 
in both models. 
The third chapter studied the impacts of US Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) on the 
economy of Malaysia. This chapter uses a Bayesian SVAR with the sign and zero restrictions, 
but we expand the model with block exogeneity, as Malaysia is a small open economy. The 
results show that US economic policy uncertainty exerts negative impacts on the Malaysian 
economy. We also found that US EPU shocks do explain considerable fractions of forecast 
variance of the macroeconomic variables of Malaysia. We further expand the model to 
include financial stability and forward-looking economic indicator for Malaysia and found 
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OVERVIEW OF MALAYSIAN ECONOMY 
Malaysia is characterized as an upper middle-income country with GDP (PPP) of 
USD1,064,795 and ranked at number 25 in the world in 2019. It is situated in 
Southeast Asia, bordering with Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and Brunei. The 
population of Malaysia as of March 2020 is 32.73 million people. Malaysia 
experienced average growth rate of 6.35 per cent over the past six decades. Lehar et. 
al. (2014) attributed Malaysia’s high growth over the past decades to the structural 
shifts in Malaysian economy, since the independence in 1957 from Great Britain, that 
has transformed Malaysia into a developing country.  
Malaysia employed an economic restructuring plan, New Economic Policy (NEP) 
from 1971 to 1990. This economic plan was introduced mainly to alleviate poverty 
and improve the distribution of wealth among citizen, with the target of distributing 
around 30 per cent of the wealth to Bumiputra (or indigenous) people towards the end 
of 1990 (Torii, 1997). Within this framework, high economic growth in line with 
industrial transformation took place. Specifically, Malaysia shifted its focus from an 
economy that was based on agriculture to an economy that is based on manufacturing 
industry.  
The 1970s and 1980s are also the periods of aggressive attempts by the Malaysian 
government to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), mainly to boost and support 
the industrialization in the economy. These FDIs further support the transition of 
Malaysian economy from the primarily mining and agricultural one to a more diverse 
economy, including manufacturing and services (Sulong, 1990). There are several 
13 
 
factors that contributes to the attractiveness of Malaysia as an FDI destination such as 
the government’s policies (e.g., Investment Incentives Act 1968, which helped to 
establish the free trading area in the country, and the open policy of the provision on 
export), sustained growth, political stability, and strategic location. Other than that, 
as Malaysia’s labour force was relatively inexpensive, educated, and abundant at that 
time, it fulfilled the needs of foreign firms to cut their production costs (Sulong 1990). 
As a result, Malaysia recorded a high growth of FDI, from 1970 to 1990, of 17.67 per 
cent annual growth.  
Meanwhile, exports have become one of Malaysia’s crucial development instrument 
in 1980s, with its highest value reaching double the value of GDP at that time (Jomo, 
1990). During 1970s and 1980s, major commodity exports were palm oil, petroleum, 
rubber, natural gas, and tin. At that time, exports of manufactured goods have 
gradually become more significant, and electrical and electronics products accounted 
for the most important share among all manufactured exports (Jomo, 1990). This was 
accompanied by a parallel reduction in the importance of the agricultural and mining 
sector. In 2019, electrical and electronic products account for the largest share 
representing about 38 per cent of all exports. Malaysia is also considered as one of 
the most open countries in the world. Percentage of trade over GDP of Malaysia in 
2018 was 131 per cent, signifying the importance of trade in Malaysian economy. 
Malaysia also recorded trade surplus of double digit from 2017 to 2019, and recorded 
trade surplus for 22 consecutive years. 
High dependency on export and FDI for driving the growth in Malaysia could also 
means that Malaysia is vulnerable to the external macroeconomic shocks. Vast 
literatures have attempted to study the effects of various external macroeconomic 
shocks on Malaysia, but none has attempted to investigate the effects of external 
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economic policy uncertainty shock. Moreover, as one of the main trading partners for 
Malaysia, and the common proxy for the world economy, any disturbances in US 
economy will most likely affecting Malaysia as well. Recent advances in quantifying 
economic policy uncertainty by Baker et. al. (2016) made it possible to study the 
effects of US economic policy uncertainty shock on Malaysian economy, which will 
be discussed further in Chapter Three. 
Other important policy that contributed to the Malaysian economic growth includes 
pragmatic monetary policy management. In the next section, we will discuss the 
monetary policy framework in Malaysia. We will also discuss the evolution of Islamic 
banks in Malaysia, which makes Malaysia unique as it is one of the countries that 
practices the dual banking system under the same monetary policy framework. 
OVERVIEW OF MALAYSIAN MONETARY 
POLICY 
Monetary policy in Malaysia is governed by the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), 
which was established in 1959. BNM is administered under the Central Bank of 
Malaysia Act 1958 and it has been amended several times, which the latest 
amendment is the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009. There are four central roles of 
the BNM as listed by the Central Bank Act 2009: promoting a stable monetary system, 
promoting high and stable growth, ensure stability of profit and exchange rate, and 
maintaining price stability.  
Monetary policy in Malaysia evolved from the monetary targeting prior to 1990s to 
interest rates targeting starting from mid-1990s. After the Asian financial crisis in 
1997/1998, the monetary policy system in Malaysia changed towards a more market 
based monetary policy implementation (BNM, 1999).  
15 
 
Firstly, M1 was used as the policy target in Malaysia since 1970s until 1987. Post 
financial liberalization in the early 1980s, the annual growth of the M1 sharply 
dropped due to the world oil crisis and the commodity crisis. Due to this high volatility 
in the growth of M1, BNM shifted its policy from using M1 to M3 as the policy target 
in 1987. In mid-1990s, money supply became more volatile and this has led the BNM 
to shift from monetary targeting policy to the interest rate targeting policy. The other 
reason that interest rate became the targeting policy was the heightened globalisation 
of the financial services. Globalisation in the financial sector has reduced the power 
of the BNM to formulate its monetary policy solely based on domestic factors and it 
also makes it more difficult to predict money demand (Latifah, 2005). Monetary 
aggregate was also not suitable as the monetary policy target due to its inferior 
quantitative ability to forecast consumption, investment, and inflation. Consequently, 
BNM shifted to the interest rate targeting policy and Taylor Rule was utilized to 
monitor the interest rate and inflation.  
There are three main evolutions during the implementation of interest rate targeting 
in Malaysia. Firstly, from November 1995 to September 1998, the BNM has 
introduced a new Base Lending Rate (BLR) framework which includes the 3-month 
interbank rate in the BLR formula. Next, since September 1998, the BNM has 
employed interest rate targeting with a fixed exchange rate and modified the BLR 
calculation, by including the Intervention Rate in the calculation of the BLR. BNM 
also imposed capital control due to the Asian Financial Crisis to stabilize the economy 
in 1998. Lastly, in April 2004, BNM introduced the Overnight Policy Rate (OPR) to 
signal the monetary policy stance. Afterwards, BNM progressively liberalized capital 
control, and has abolished the fixed exchange rate regime in July 2005. 
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As regard to domestic deposit and lending rate, in 1978, Malaysia liberalized its 
domestic interest rates where each bank was permitted to determine their own 
commercial rates. Prior to 1987, each bank calculated their cost of funds and 
determined the BLR after BNM decided the amount of the Liquidity of Assets, 
Overhead, and Reserve Requirements. In 1987, computation of the BLR was set 
following the BLR of two lead banks, with a window of 0.5 per cent. In 1991, the 
BLR was calculated after including the profit margin of 0.25 per cent and including 
the costs of staff, funding, and overhead. After 1995, BNM interbank rate was 
included in the computation of the BLR. In 1998, BNM interbank rate was replaced 
with the BNM intervention rate. Lastly, in April 2004, the BNM intervention rate was 
replaced with OPR. It sets the target rate of the day-to-day liquidity operation of BNM 
and would serve as the primary reference for domestic rates. To minimize the 
volatility of the OPR, BNM set 0.25 per cent as the upper and lower limits to facilitate 
the lending activities in Malaysia (BNM, 2004). 
BNM’s monetary policy stance could affect the inflation level and economic activities 
in Malaysian economy because BNM could control the money supply and liquidity 
by setting the statutory reserve requirement and/or adjusting the short-term interest 
rate in the money market. When BNM wants to stimulate the economy, it could reduce 
the short-term interest rates and/or increase the bank reserves. This would stimulate 
the economy where more credit will be available in the money market (and vice versa 
to contract the economy). However, monetary policy is not the only factor that could 
influence the availability of credit in an economy, e.g., loans to private sectors. 
Structural change in financial framework, changes in regulations for loans approval, 
and changes in the competition in the banking sectors, among others, could 
significantly affect this as well. These factors are what economists referred to as the 
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credit supply shock. As loans to private sector is important in driving Malaysian 
economy, it is important to address the effects of credit supply shock in Malaysia. 
Private domestic loan per GDP in Malaysia is recorded at 120.9 per cent in 2019, 
signifying high dependency on credit for private sectors in Malaysia. Shocks affecting 
the credit to private sectors will have high possibility to affect Malaysian economy as 
well. In Chapter Two, we discuss the effects of credit supply shocks on the economy 
of Malaysia. We also compare the effects of credit supply shocks and monetary 
shocks in Chapter Two. 
ISLAMIC BANKING IN MALAYSIA 
Malaysia is considered as the leading country in Islamic banking and finance 
(Husseini et. al. 2019). Malaysia ranked first in Islamic Finance Development 
Indicator (IFDI) in 2019 and from its five main indicators, Malaysia was ranked first 
in four of the indicators: quantitative development, knowledge, governance, and 
awareness. Malaysia’s achievement as the leading country in Islamic finance is also 
consistent throughout past years where it ranked first in the IFDI consistently from 
2012 to 2019. It should also be noted that Malaysia is one of the countries that practice 
dual banking system, where Islamic banks and conventional banks operate together 
under the same monetary policy framework.  
The principle of Islamic finance was first implemented in Malaysia, through the 
introduction of the Pilgrims Saving Account Corporation (PSAC) in 1963. Main 
objective of PSAC was to manage the saving for Muslims who intended to perform 
hajj in Mecca. (Perry and Rehman, 2011). PSAC did not pay any interest to the 
depositors but invested their savings and paid them the dividend in the form of hibah 
every year. PSAC was established without the intention of being a bank, although it 
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is similar to the extent that they need to keep and manage the depositor’s money. 
Thus, it was only considered as a saving institution or as an investment institution. 
Other than the interest-free saving function, Muslims in Malaysia were also in need 
of financing, such as personal loans, mortgage loans, car loans, and business setup 
that are interest-free. Since PSAC’s function is limited only to saving keeping 
function for the intention of performing hajj, there was a high demand from Muslims 
in Malaysia for a financing service without charging interest or riba as well. Thus, the 
first Islamic bank, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB), was established in 1983. It 
was the only fully-fledged Islamic Bank in Malaysia for 16 years, until the 
establishment of the second Islamic bank in 1999. The profit made by this only 
Islamic bank became a benchmark for the Islamic banking industry at that time and 
this has motivated the conventional banks to convince the government to allow them 
to offer Islamic banking products and services as well.  
In response to this, BNM introduced the ‘Interest Free Banking Scheme (IFBS) for 
the conventional banks in March 1993. Three banks namely Malayan Banking 
Berhad, Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad, and the United Malayan Banking 
Corporation were selected as the pioneers for this scheme. The decision to permit 
IFBS in the conventional banks was to increase competition in the market and 
progressively liberalize the industry. To facilitate the Islamic banking industry, in 
January 1994, BNM launched the Islamic Interbank Money Market (IIMM). One of 
the main objectives of IIMM was to provide short-term funding to Islamic financial 
institutions. Furthermore, to enhance competition in the industry, in April 1999, the 
second full-fledged Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad, was established.  
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In 2002, Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) was established and Malaysia was 
chosen to be the Secretariat. The main objective of the IFSB was to issue global 
guidelines and standards for the Islamic finance and banking industry as well as 
Takaful industry and Islamic capital market for participating countries. After 20 years 
of the Islamic banks establishment in Malaysia, BNM liberalized the Islamic banking 
and finance industry by issuing three licences to the foreign Islamic banks in 2004: 
Al Rajhi Investment Bank, Kuwait Finance House, and Saudi and Qatar Investment 
Group, allowing them to operate in Malaysia alongside existing domestic Islamic 
banks.  
Total asset of the Islamic banks was only RM 326 million in 1984, where there was 
only one Islamic bank. In 2019, there were 16 Islamic banks and the total assets were 
valued at RM 835,193.5 million, with an annual average growth rate of 25.13 per 
cent. As for the financing of Islamic banks, the total financing of Islamic banks grew 
at an annual average growth rate of 17.22 per cent from 2006 to 2019. For comparison, 
total financing of Malaysian banking system grew at an annual growth rate of 8.25 
per cent and conventional banks’ total financing grew at an annual rate of 5.9 per cent 
from 2006 to 2012. This shows that Islamic loans grew at a much faster rate than 
conventional loans in Malaysia. Islamic banks’ market share of financing was 34.89 
per cent in 2019 compared to 65.11 per cent from conventional banks. In 2006, the 
value was only 13.58 per cent for Islamic banks and 86.42 per cent for commercial 
banks. This increasing importance of Islamic banking in providing credit in Malaysia, 
motivated this thesis to investigate further the effects of monetary policy shock on 
Islamic and conventional loans as well as decomposing them into sectors and 




This thesis applies recent advances in econometric analysis to examine the dynamics 
of the Malaysian economy. The first chapter utilises a large panel dataset in a Factor 
Augmented VAR (FAVAR) framework to explore the effects of monetary policy 
shocks on disaggregated loans. The second chapter uses Bayesian SVAR with sign 
restrictions to identify and measure the effects of credit supply shocks, and further 
distinguish between households and non-financial corporation’s credit supply shocks. 
The third chapter also uses a Bayesian SVAR to study the effect of external economic 
policy uncertainty (EPU) shocks on the Malaysian economy. In this chapter, we apply 
the block exogeneity assumption, given that Malaysia is a small open economy, and 
we apply sign and zero restrictions to identify the economic shocks.  
In the first chapter, we look at the impact of monetary policy shocks on disaggregated 
loans in Malaysia. Malaysia adopted a dual banking system where Islamic and 
conventional banks coexist. Islamic banks offer products that required to follow 
Shari’ah Law, including the prohibition of the interest rate. How does this translate 
into the bank lending channel in the monetary transmission mechanism?  
Given that total loan consists of different sectors, we also aim to see if there are any 
different responses between these sectors while being separated by Islamic and 
conventional loans. The same analysis is done for the various purposes of loans that 
make up the total loans. The existing literature typically uses simple VAR to examine 
the sectoral loans in Malaysia, and it is unrealistic to achieve it for every single 
component by using simple VAR. We believe that our empirical research is beneficial 
for central bank and policymakers to better evaluate the monetary strategy in 
Malaysia, by looking at specific sectors, or purposes, or bank types. To achieve this, 
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we employ Factor Augmented VAR (FAVAR) which large dataset could be 
summarised into a smaller number of factors and be added to VAR system. One 
advantage that this methodology offers is that impulse response function for each 
variable in the large dataset can be generated. The results suggest that expansionary 
monetary policy shocks lower Industrial Production growth, lower price, and 
decreases loans. Islamic loans are significantly more responsive compared to 
conventional loans, consistent with the findings from recent literature. Decomposing 
each type of bank loans into sectors and purposes, we found significant heterogeneity 
of the responses. This first chapter contributes to the study of Islamic bank lending 
channel and contributes to the sectoral or disaggregated level of bank lending channel. 
In the second chapter, we assess the effects of credit supply shocks on the 
macroeconomic variables of Malaysia. Despite growing interest in the study of credit 
supply shocks after the Global Financial Crisis, there has been no study of the effects 
of credit supply shocks in Malaysia. The reason for the literature gap could be that 
during the economic crisis, drop in lending growth in Malaysia was not as severe as 
in developed countries. This is probably due to the financial restructuring in Malaysia, 
implemented after the Asian Financial Crisis. The restructuring involves a lot of 
innovations in the credit market in Malaysia, and we argue that these innovations lead 
to credit supply shocks.  
We employ the Bayesian SVAR and identify the credit supply shocks, along with 
other standard economic shocks (aggregate demand, aggregate supply, and monetary 
shocks), by using sign restrictions and follow the identification scheme from Gambetti 
and Musso (2016). We found that an expansionary credit supply shock positively 
effects Malaysian economy, consistent with literature. From the variance 
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decomposition analysis, we found that credit supply shocks explain substantial 
percentage of forecast variance of GDP growth, inflation and especially, credit growth 
in Malaysia. 
Motivated by the suggestion for future research in Gambetti and Musso (2016), we 
decompose total private non-financial corporation loans into its 2 components: 
households and non-financial corporations (NFC). We notice that the growth rate of 
households and non-financial corporations varies significantly, unlike in economies 
studied extensively in this subject matter (US, UK, Euro Area). Thus, there is a need 
to identify and examine the effects of each component’s credit supply shocks. We link 
the households’ credit to consumption part of GDP and non-financial corporations’ 
credit to investment part of GDP, following Duchi and Elbourne (2016). The results 
show differences between these two components, suggesting that different treatments 
or policy formulations are needed, instead of using the same policy to boost or 
regulate the credit market in Malaysia. This second chapter contributes to the 
literature of credit and financial sector of Malaysia by being the first to identify and 
examine the effects of credit supply shocks. We also contribute to the literature of 
credit supply shocks by separating the total credit into its individual components. 
In the third chapter, we examine the external Economic Policy Uncertainty on the 
Malaysian economy. Given the high level of trade openness and financial linkage of 
Malaysia with others, it is highly possible that economic shocks originated from other 
countries will have an effect on the Malaysian economy, especially from the major 
trading partner and advanced country, namely US, which is usually used as the proxy 
for external economy in the studies of external shocks in Malaysia. Although there 
have been numbers of studies done to measure the effect of external shocks affecting 
the Malaysian economy, none has attempted to examine how the external economic 
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policy uncertainty affecting Malaysian domestic economy. Studies on how US 
economic policy uncertainty propagated to other economies, especially small open 
and developing economy, is still limited. We applied Bayesian SVAR with block 
exogeneity both on impact and on VAR parameters as per the assumption of Malaysia 
as a small open economy. We identify the shocks based on sign and zero restrictions 
and do not put any restriction on domestic variables for the shocks originated from 
US. We found that US economic policy uncertainty lowers Industrial Production 
growth. We also add the variables for financial stability and forward-looking 
economic indicator in our extended analysis and found that US EPU shock adversely 
affects both. The results offer more evidence that US economic policy uncertainty 
shocks does result in an adverse effect on a small, open, and developing economy like 
Malaysia. This third chapter add to the literature on the study of external economic 
shocks affecting Malaysian economy by adding the element of economic policy 
uncertainty shocks. This chapter also contributes to the study on transmission effects 
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It is well established that the bank lending channel is a key part of the monetary 
transmission mechanism.  The evidence of this channel is well established for banks 
with different asset size (Kashyap and Stein, 1995), capitalisation (Kishan and Opiela, 
2000), and liquidity (Stein and Kashyap, 2000). Nevertheless, there is still limited 
evidence on the validity of this mechanism for different bank types1, sectors, and 
purposes of the loans.  
Examining the lending channel for these different categories is important because 
they may have different responses to monetary policy shock. In this chapter, we 
empirically compare the bank lending channel in a dual banking system of Malaysia, 
where Islamic and conventional banks operate together under the supervision of the 
same central bank regulations. We then further examine the responses of different 
sectors and different purposes of loans from these two types of banks. 
The study of the bank lending channel in Malaysia has received adequate attention. 
These studies include Ibrahim (2005) and Vaithilingam et al. (2003) among others. 
Overall, these studies agree on the existence of bank lending channel and also agree 
on the vital role played by the banking sector in the transmission of monetary policy 
in Malaysia. However, these studies just focused on aggregate bank lending data for 
the whole banking system without separating Islamic and conventional loans. 
Total loans of the banking institutions in Malaysia increased from MYR 593.01 
billion in 2006 to MYR 1673.48 billion, which was equal to 115 per cent of its’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2018. The percentage share of the Islamic loans out of the 
                                                             
1 In this case, we refer the ‘types’ to Islamic and conventional banks.  
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total banking loans was only 13.24 per cent in 2006 and reaching 32.29 per cent in 
2018, proving that it is imperative to study this subject matter due to its increasing 
importance.  Figure 1-1 illustrates the increasing importance that Islamic loans play 
in providing finance to the Malaysian economy. It is also worth noting that the 
increasing trend of the total loan from both banks where it shows an increase of 182 
per cent, 120 per cent for conventional loans, and 588 per cent for Islamic loans from 
2006 to 2018.  
 
Figure 1-1: Islamic and Conventional Loans in Malaysian Ringgit, 2006-2018 
 
Bank lending is also the most significant component of assets for both conventional 
and Islamic banks in Malaysia. Figure 1-2 shows the percentage of total loans over 
total assets for Islamic and conventional banks. There has been an increasing trend of 
loan percentage in total assets for Islamic banks. In 2007, the value was just 47 per 
cent and increased to 73 per cent in 2018. The conventional bank maintained the loan 
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Figure 1-2: Share of Loans in Total Assets of Islamic and Conventional Banks, 2007-2018 
 
 
Although limited, there are numbers of studies that examine the response of Islamic 
bank lending channel in Malaysia. Said and Ismail (2007) found the presence of the 
bank lending channel by using fixed effect model with GLS estimation. Sukmana and 
Kassim (2010) use VAR analysis and found that Islamic loans are significant in 
transmitting the monetary policy in Malaysia. Ibrahim and Sukmana (2011) uses 
Toda-Yamamoto causality test and employed the innovation accounting approach and 
found a strong causal impact of monetary policy rate on Islamic loans. Majid and 
Hassin (2014) also found the same conclusion by using ARDL methodology. 
Another strand of literature compares bank lending channel between Islamic and 
conventional banks. Kassim et al. (2009) employs VAR and found that Islamic banks 
are more affected by monetary policy shocks compared to conventional banks in 
Malaysia. This is also supported by a study done by Aysan et al. (2017) for Turkey 
dataset. However, Zaheer et al. (2013) found a contrasting result for Pakistan. Thus, 
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Most of the available literature on bank lending channel focused on the effects of 
monetary policy on loans at the aggregate level. Sectoral assessment of bank lending 
channel has not received the required attention from academics and policymakers 
alike. Little is known about how loans from different sectors respond to monetary 
shocks. There are only very few studies that compare the effect of monetary policy 
on bank lending across sectors. Among others, Ibrahim (2005) and Karim et al. (2006) 
found that monetary policy tightening in Malaysia reduces loans for all the sectors 
where some sectors are more affected by monetary tightening. Majid and Hasin 
(2014) study the sectoral Islamic lending channel and found the same conclusion, but 
this study only focuses on Islamic sectoral loans. One gap that could be found in all 
these papers is the missing of the household sector, which contributes to the biggest 
share out of total loan in Malaysia. 
We also aim to look at how loans for different purposes respond to monetary shocks. 
Different firms from different sectors might borrow for a common purpose (e.g. a 
manufacturing firm and an agriculture firm applying for loans to purchase a fixed 
asset or to finance working capital).  We believe the empirical evidence for this 
disaggregation of loan could uncover clearer picture on the effectiveness of monetary 
policy in influencing bank lending channel across purposes of loans. 
Therefore, we aim to answer the question as to whether the monetary shocks in 
Malaysia has had a different impact on different sectors and different purposes of 
loans from different types of banks. It is believed that such empirics are useful to 
guide academics and policymakers in Malaysia for the evaluations and formulations 
of monetary policy.  
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We aim to contribute to the literature on Islamic finance by applying a more recent 
econometric approach to analyse the effect of monetary policy in an economy with a 
dual banking system. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to estimate 
a Factor Augmented VAR model (FAVAR) for the study of the bank lending channel 
in a dual banking economy. Further, empirical studies on Malaysia have not yet 
explored whether the responses of Islamic and conventional loans differ across sectors 
and purposes all in a single study for a better comparison. Therefore, we aim to fill 
this gap by applying a data-rich methodology in the bank lending channel for 
Malaysia.  
Our results suggest the existence of the bank lending channel in Malaysia. Bank loans 
respond negatively to a contractionary monetary policy shock, but there are 
differences in magnitude and timing between Islamic and conventional banks. We 
found that responses of loans to monetary shocks are more substantial and faster for 
Islamic banks compared to conventional banks. On the sectoral and purposes level, 
the results are heterogeneous. 
This study will discuss the overview of Malaysian monetary framework, Islamic 
banking concept and Islamic banking in Malaysia in the next subsections. Section 2 
describes the methodology adopted in this study. Section 3 explained the empirical 




1.1.1 HISTORY OF MALAYSIAN MONETARY 
FRAMEWORK  
Malaysia focused only on M1 as the monetary target before the 1990s and later 
changed to M3 as a policy target due to the growth in the financial sector. There were 
few limitations of using monetary targeting at the time, and this forced Malaysia to 
look for other means for policy target. Bulk capital flows in the early 1990s 
contributed to the uncertainty of monetary aggregates, and financial liberalisation has 
reformed the money demand function. Thus, in 1995, the Malaysia’s central bank 
switched to interest rate targeting by opting to use the 3-month interbank rate as the 
policy rate. (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999). The changes were made with the 
consideration that interest rate stability is crucial to support a steady financial system. 
In September 1998, the intervention rate was used as a policy rate, replacing the 3-
month money market rate. The intervention rate is utilised in the calculation of the 
Base Lending Rate (BLR) to allow for faster transmission from the policy rate to 
banking’s retail rate. Finally, in April 2004, BNM changed its policy rate to the 
overnight policy rate (OPR). 
1.1.2 CONCEPTS OF ISLAMIC BANKING AND 
ISLAMIC BANKING IN MALAYSIA 
The main difference between Islamic banks and conventional banks is in terms of 
charging interest rates. In principle, a predetermined interest rate is prohibited in 
Islamic practice. Islamic banks are prohibited to offer a fixed return on deposits or 
charge a predetermined rate on loans. The framework of Islamic banks is based on 
the Sharia principles under the guidelines of the Quran and Islamic law. The basis of 
the framework is to replace the standard predetermined interest rate with profit and 
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loss sharing rate (Chong and Liu, 2009). There are four types of agreements in Islamic 
finance, namely Murabahah, Ijarah, Mudharabah, and Musharakah.  
 Murabahah fundamentally is an agreement where a commodity is sold for cost 
plus profit. Islamic banks buy the commodity for the borrowers at first, and 
the borrowers must buy it back from them at a ‘marked-up’ price (Shaban et 
al., 2016). It must be first established, that both buyer and seller know and 
agree on the cost and profit of the commodity.  
 Ijarah, or leasing, is a transfer of legal rights to use facilities or equipment at 
an agreed rent to customers. This type of contract commonly used for 
financing that involves the purchase of vehicles and properties.  
 Mudarabah financing requires Islamic banks to act as the capital providers, 
and customers are the ones managing the funds. Any profit obtained in 
Mudarabah financing is shared based on a predetermined PLS ratio, and any 
financial losses occurred must be borne by the banks. This is only if the losses 
occurred are not because of breach of contracted terms, negligence, or 
mismanagement by the customers.  
 Musharakah financing is an agreement where banks and entrepreneurs agree 
to the contribution of capital and share any profit or loss occurred, for a 
specific business project according to an agreed ratio. Depending on the 
agreement, the financing can be paid either in a timely manner or lump sum.  
These concepts of Islamic loans portray the absence of interest rates, distinguishing 
the Islamic financing and conventional financing. However, it is worth noting that 
profit and loss sharing rate and mark-up rate in the contract may use conventional 
interest rates as a benchmark (Hans, 2013).  
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Under the Islamic Bank Act 1983, the first Islamic bank was established in Malaysia 
in the same year. This was the starting point of the adoption of a dual banking system 
where Islamic and conventional banks operate together within the overall financial 
framework in Malaysia.  
In 1993, a new concept of “Islamic banking window” was introduced. This concept 
allows conventional banks to offer Islamic banking products using their existing. 
There was a fear that the deposit used to offer financing products via this window are 
from the same source of conventional banking operations, which does not separate 
legal and illegal business activities according to Sharia law (Ariff, 2017).  
As a solution, in 1996, conventional banks that wanted to offer Islamic banking 
products had to open a full-fledged Islamic banking branches, replacing the concept 
of Islamic banking windows, with the all the components and activities within these 
branches to be fully regulated under the Sharia Law (e.g., deposit money could not be 
invested into gambling businesses). 
Under this new policy, conventional banks could continue to leverage their 
established reputation and network infrastructure. The established reputation resulted 
in better consumer acceptance among Muslims in Malaysia. Since then, the 
importance of the Islamic banking industry in the national financial framework in 





In order to preserve the degrees of freedom, studies that employed the standard VAR 
approach to measuring the effect of monetary policy often opted to utilise a limited 
number of variables. This leads to a standard limitation of VAR, such as it might not 
be able to capture the full information necessary in the decision making of 
policymakers. Sims (1992) mentioned that estimating a VAR with a small number of 
variables can lead to price puzzle where a small VAR model might show increasing 
inflationary pressure, but in theory, contractionary monetary policy shocks should 
lower the prices. In FAVAR methodology, a large panel dataset can be reduced to a 
few factors, and these factors then added to the VAR model. This approach is more 
accurate because it uses an information set that is more similar to the one that is 
available to the monetary authorities as policymakers depend on vast number of 
macroeconomic data series for their decision making. The following is a brief 
description of the FAVAR methodology. 
Bernanke et al. (2005) introduced the application of FAVAR in studying monetary 
policy. Since then, numbers of literature have followed the approach; as in Lagana 
and Mountford (2005); Mumtaz and Surico (2009); Fernald et al. (2014); and Kabuni 
and Ngwenya, (2011). These papers found that FAVAR methodology can provide 
more accurate and reliable estimates than standard VAR. Nonetheless, the application 
of FAVAR in assessing monetary policy in Malaysia is minimal as only one article 
has used this approach so far. Chua (2012) employed the FAVAR framework to assess 
the monetary policy in Malaysia and employed 78 macroeconomic time series data 
reflecting numbers of economics variables to investigate the effects of monetary 
shocks to the Malaysian economy. The study focused only on the problem of price 
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puzzle, and on the financing side, Chua (2012) only included total loan as the variable. 
As for studying the responses of from Islamic banks, no literature yet to explore it by 
using this method. Thus, we attempt to fill the gap by studying responses of sectoral 
loans and loans by purposes for both Islamic and conventional banks to monetary 
shocks by using FAVAR approach. 
1.2.1 FAVAR  
We assume that a (𝑁 x 1) vector of macroeconomic time series  𝑋𝑡 to be represented 
as a linear combination of the (𝐾 x 1) vector of unobservable factors, 𝐹𝑡, where 𝐾 is 
relatively small, (𝐾 << 𝑁) and 𝑅𝑡, (𝑀 x 1) matrix of observable variables2. The joint 




] = 𝛢(𝐿) [
𝐹𝑡−1
𝑅𝑡−1
] + 𝛿𝑡               (1-1) 
where 𝐴(𝐿) is a conformable lag polynomial of finite order 𝑑. The error term 𝛿𝑡 has 
zero mean and covariance matrix (Ψ).  
The FAVAR model in (1-1) cannot be estimated directly as 𝐹𝑡 is not observed. 
Nevertheless, since 𝐹𝑡 is assumed to represent the information contained in 𝑋𝑡, it 
should be possible to infer something about 𝐹𝑡 from the dataset. The following 
relationship between 𝑋𝑡 and 𝐹𝑡 is assumed: 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝜓
𝑓𝐹𝑡 + 𝜓
𝑟𝑅𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡                         (1-2) 
where 𝜓𝑓  is the (𝑁 x 𝐾) matrix of factor loadings and  𝜓𝑟 is the (𝑁 x 𝑀) matrix. 𝑒𝑡 
is the (𝑁 x 1)  vector of error terms with mean zero and assumed to be serially and 
                                                             
2 We only include monetary policy as the only observable variable following Chua (2012). 
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mutually weakly correlated. Equation (1-2) implies that the dynamics of each time 
series in the vector 𝑋𝑡 are driven by common factors (𝐹𝑡, 𝑅𝑡) and 𝑒𝑡.  
1.2.1.1 ESTIMATION 
 
It is not possible to estimate equation (1-1) directly because the factors are not 
observed. There are two methods to recover the unknown factors, as suggested in 
Bernanke et al. (2005). The first method is the two-step estimation using principal 
components. The second method is a joint estimation by single-step likelihood 
approach. The two-step estimation approach is based upon the methodology 
facilitated in Stock and Watson (2002). The single-step approach was commonly 
denoted as likelihood-based Gibbs-sampling and its application to large factor model 
was discussed in Eliasz (2002).  
In the two-step estimation approach, the factors are first estimated by using the 
principal components, and then their dynamics are estimated. Principal component 
involves a mathematical technique that is used to transform a large set of correlated 
variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables, called the principal components, 
which account for most of the variation in the original dataset. This approach provides 
a nonparametric way of uncovering the common space spanned by the factors of 𝑋𝑡. 
In contrast, the single step approach is fully parametric, requiring the model to be 
fully specified. Thus, imposing incorrect restrictions will lead to a biased estimates 
and this can be avoided by using the two-step approach. 
Moreover, Bernanke et al. (2005) compared these two methods and concluded that 
the computationally more difficult single-step approach did not generate significantly 
better results than the two-step approach. This conclusion could help explain the 
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predominantly favouring of two-step approach in factor estimation throughout the 
vast literature on FAVAR.  
1.2.1.2 IDENTIFICATION OF THE FACTORS 
 
In the first step of the principal components approach, we estimate the common 
component, 𝐶(𝐹𝑡, 𝑅𝑡) from the first (𝐾 + 𝑀) principle components of 𝑋𝑡. Since 𝑅𝑡is 
not imposed as an observable component in the first stage, the first 𝐾 principal 
components are assumed to uncover the space spanned by the estimated factors of the 
dataset 𝑋𝑡. This would mean that our monetary policy instrument, 𝑅𝑡, would be part 
of a linear combination of underlying ?̂?(𝐹𝑡, 𝑅𝑡). Thus, it would not be valid to 
estimate a VAR and then identifying the monetary policy shock recursively. Hence, 
we must remove the dependence of ?̂?(𝐹𝑡, 𝑅𝑡) on 𝑅𝑡. To obtain the factors free from 
the policy instrument effect, Bernanke et. al. (2005) procedure is followed. 
Common factors ?̂?(𝐹𝑡, 𝑅𝑡) are first estimated utilising all the variables in 𝑋𝑡 by using 
principal components. Then, variables in 𝑋𝑡 are divided into two categories: ‘fast-
moving’ and ‘slow-moving’. The slow-moving variables are usually reported in a 
frequency of monthly or quarterly basis (e.g., Industrial Production Index), while the 
fast-moving variables are usually reported in a daily basis (e.g., stock market data and 
exchange rate) and highly sensitive to economic news or policy shocks. These fast-
moving variables are expected to react contemporaneously to changes in observable 
variables. The classification of variables for each category is provided in Appendix 
1-C.  
Common components ?̂? then are regressed on the estimated slow-moving factors and 




𝑠 + 𝜛𝑓𝑅𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡                                                                      (1-3) 
where 𝜛𝑠 is the coefficient matrix of estimated slow-moving factors, 𝜛𝑓 is the 
coefficient vector of the monetary policy variable and 𝜂𝑡 is the vector of error terms. 
The unobservable factors ?̂?𝑡 are obtained from: 
?̂?𝑡 = ?̂?(𝐹𝑡, 𝑅𝑡) − 𝜛
𝑓𝑅𝑡                            (1-4) 
As regard to the extraction procedures of the factors using the principal components, 
we follow Bernanke et. al. (2005) to restrict the factors by 𝐹′𝐹/𝑇 = 𝐼 and obtained 
?̂? = √𝑇?̂?, where ?̂? are the eigenvectors corresponding to the 𝐾 largest eigenvalues 
of 𝑋𝑋′, which are sorted in a descending order. The second stage involves estimating 
Equation (1-1) with the estimated factors ?̂?𝑡 and the observable variables 𝑅𝑡.  
1.2.1.3 IDENTIFICATION OF THE VAR 
 
Once the estimated factors are obtained, the next step involves estimation of the VAR 
model that includes ?̂?𝑡  and 𝑅𝑡. Following Bernanke et al. (2005), to identify the 
macroeconomic shocks, we are assuming a recursive structure, where the factors 
entering equation (1-2) respond with a lag to an unanticipated change in monetary 
policy rate. This recursive assumption utilizes Cholesky Decomposition of the 
variance covariance matrix of the estimated residuals. Cholesky decomposition is an 
algorithm for transforming a symmetric positive definite matrix into a lower 
triangular matrix multiplied by its transpose. Although there are other alternative 
identification schemes for the monetary policy shock identification available in the 
literature (e.g., sign restrictions as in Mumtaz and Surico (2009)), the focus of our 
study is to highlight the different responses of different type of loans to the monetary 
policy shock and not to analyze alternative identification schemes. Thus, we follow 
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Bernanke et al. (2005) in using a Cholesky decomposition scheme for the shock 
identification. 
The Cholesky decomposition implies a strict causal ordering of the variables in the 
VAR. The variable ordered last responds contemporaneously to all the other 
variables, while other variables respond with a lag to the variable ordered last. The 
variable ordered first responds with a lag to all the other variables. A standard 
identification assumption in VAR studies of the monetary policy shock is that it is 
orthogonal to the variables in the policy rule, as in other economic variables do not 
respond contemporaneously to the monetary policy shock. Thus, we utilizes the 
Cholesky decomposition scheme in which our short-term interest rate is ordered last 
and we treat its innovations as the monetary policy shocks.  
We follow the procedure of VAR estimation using Matlab code from Koop and 
Korobilis’ (2009). We use diffuse priors to obtain impulse responses and the error 
band was derived from the posterior density of the impulse responses. We employed 
Gibbs sampling of 30,000 iterations, and we discard the first 20,000 draws to estimate 
the prior distribution. We standardise the monetary policy shocks to an increase of 1 
per cent of the overnight interbank rate. 
1.2.2 DETERMINATION OF THE NUMBER OF 
FACTORS  
We need to determine the appropriate number of factors to be extracted from the 
Principle Component and include them in our FAVAR model. In doing so, we need 
to make a choice in the trade-off between over-fitting and goodness-of-fit of the 
specification. This can be done through two different suggested manners: principal 
component analysis or using information criteria.   
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Figure 1-3 illustrates the scree plot which shows us the eigenvalues ordered from 
largest to smallest3. Sum of all eigenvalue is equal to the number of variables. In our 
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Figure 1-3: Scree Plot 
 
We can get the percentage of cumulative percentage of variation in our dataset of each 
factor by dividing eigenvalue with scaled variances of our variables (113). The 
percentage of cumulative variation is shown in Figure 1-4. From this, we decided to 
include 10 factors in our FAVAR model, as 51.3 per cent variation in our dataset 
could be represented as we decided that 50 per cent is our threshold4. 
 
                                                             
3 We show the results when using sectoral loans data as the benchmark model. Results for this analysis 
is included in Appendix 1-D. Although 9 factors are enough to reach 50 per cent of variation explained 
in purposes model, we opted for 10 factors for consistency with sectoral model. 
4 Choosing 9 factors will give us 48.97 per cent variation explained. Choosing more than 10 factors 
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Figure 1-4: Cumulative Variation Explained 
 
 
Applying the Bai and Ng (2002) criteria to determine the optimal number of (static) 
factors produces results as shown in Table 1-1 
Factors IC1 IC2 IC3 PC1 PC2 PC3 BIC3 AIC3 
1 -0.079 -0.070 -0.102 0.897 0.902 0.887 0.939 0.881 
2 -0.103 -0.085 -0.148 0.856 0.864 0.834 0.938 0.823* 
3 -0.120 -0.095* -0.188 0.824 0.837 0.791 0.947 0.775 
4 -0.128 -0.094 -0.219 0.804 0.821 0.760 0.967 0.739 
5 -0.135* -0.092 -0.249 0.789 0.810 0.734 0.990 0.706 
6 -0.131 -0.079 -0.267 0.783 0.808* 0.717 1.024 0.684 
7 -0.125 -0.064 -0.284 0.780* 0.810 0.704 1.059 0.664 
8 -0.115 -0.046 -0.296 0.782 0.815 0.694 1.098 0.648 
9 -0.099 -0.021 -0.303 0.788 0.825 0.689 1.141 0.637 
10 -0.081 0.005 -0.308* 0.796 0.838 0.686* 1.185* 0.628 
Table 1-1: Results for Bai and Ng (2002) Information Criteria 
 
As suggested by the results from both inspections, we simulate our FAVAR model 
with 10 factors, as it is a reasonable compromise between choosing too many factors 
and having too few factors.  
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1.2.3 LAG SELECTION 
To further specify our model, we also need to determine the number of lags p in the 
VAR. The VAR literature usually advocates the use of Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) criteria for lags selection. We ran the 
lag length criteria for the data in the VAR part based on 5 different criteria: sequential 
modified LR test statistic: Final prediction error, Akaike information criterion, 
Schwarz information criterion, and Hannan-Quinn (HQ) information criterion. We 
decided on employing lag order of 1 as suggested by SC and supported by HQ. We 
ran the same test for the model with loans by purposes model and obtained similar 
suggestion which is 1 lag by SC and HQ. 
 Lag LR FPE AIC SIC HQ 
0 NA  3.59E-16 -4.34523 -4.11731 -4.25261 
1 1238.876 1.53E-19 -12.11  -9.375053*  -10.99864* 
2 279.3689   8.33e-20* -12.7458 -7.5038 -10.6157 
3 183.6282 9.02E-20 -12.7381 -4.98913 -9.5893 
4 140.6596 1.34E-19 -12.4811 -2.2251 -8.31356 
5 118.7824 2.37E-19 -12.1541 0.608913 -6.96783 
6   191.5138* 1.53E-19 -12.9817 2.288325 -6.77671 
7 129.4936 2.04E-19 -13.2816 4.495445 -6.05787 
8 116.4785 3.09E-19  -13.74632* 6.537767 -5.50384 
Table 1-2: Results for Lag Selection Criteria 
 
1.2.4 DATA 
We included a balanced panel of 113 monthly macroeconomic data in our FAVAR 
model. The data span the period from April 2006 through December 2018.  The 
reasoning behind this choice of timeframe is the reclassifications under the Financial 
Institutions Statistical System (FISS) which took effect on April 2006.   Loans to all 
customers except households are classified under both economic sectors and purpose. 
Loans to households are classified under purpose only. BNM (2018) stated that the 
breakdown before this new reclassification is strictly not comparable. 
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 A list of all the variables included in our study is provided in Appendix A. These 113 
series5  were subjected to three preliminary handlings:  
1. All the variables are checked to detect any presence of seasonality. 
Variables that exhibits seasonality is treated using X-12 function in 
EViews. 
2. Stationarity of each variable is tested using the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test. The appropriate transformation will be carried out for each 
variable that has a unit root to ensure stationarity. 
3. Standardize all variables to have zero mean and unit variance. This is 
because the data employed are on a different scale, and this can impair 
the factor extraction process in principal component analysis. 
We also need to decide on the proxy for the monetary policy rate. Chua (2012) applied 
3 months rate as the policy rate as it is considered the standard proxy for the policy 
rate for his FAVAR model.  Figure 1-5 shows the overnight policy rate and interbank 
money market rate for both overnight and 3 months in Malaysia from 2000 to 2016. 
It can be seen from the figure that the overnight interbank rate is closer to the 
Overnight Policy Rate compared to 3 months interbank rate. We chose the overnight 
interbank rate as the proxy for monetary policy as it resembles6.  
                                                             
5 Number of loans by sectors and number of loans by purpose is identical (12 each).  
6 Results using overnight money market rate as the proxy for the interest rate is included in order to 




Figure 1-5: Overnight Interbank Rate, 3 Month Interbank Rate, and Overnight Policy Rate 
 
1.3 RESULTS 
This section describes the main results. First, we present the impulse response of 
macroeconomic variables response to the monetary policy shock. Second, we discuss 
the response of conventional and Islamic bank loans along with their disaggregated 
loans. Third, we check for sensitivity of our model with a series of robustness tests 
presented at the end of this section. 
1.3.1 MACROECONOMICS VARIABLES 
Figure 1-6 shows the responses of the selected macroeconomic variables to a 
contractionary monetary policy over 36 months for our FAVAR model with ten 
factors. The impulse response function traces the effects of a one per cent shock to a 
monetary policy innovation. The significant impact of monetary policy shocks on the 
overall macroeconomic variables is clear, and the direction of the impact is in line 















































































































3 Month Interbank Rate Overnight Interbank Rate Overnight Policy Rate
44 
 
Production Index (proxied as output) decreases after 1-month lag. 1 per cent increase 
in policy rate decreases IPI up to 0.8 per cent over 36 months, and Consumer Price 
Index decreased by 0.19 per cent on impact and up to -0.07 per cent on 14th month 
before the response becomes insignificant. Total loan decreases immediately and up 
to -0.78 per cent on the 3rd year. Here, we witness an exchange rate puzzle where 
effective exchange rate responded negatively. Raghavan et al. (2010), found the same 
result in the sub-period after 1999-2007 in Malaysia. Lagana and Mountford (2005) 
found the same puzzle in UK and stated that this could possibly due to the prior 
increase of interest rate in US.  
5 Year Government securities increases immediately. The total loan took 2 months 
lag to be significantly responsive to the contractionary monetary policy shock. After 
3 years horizon, total loan decreases by 0.8 per cent due to 1 per cent shocks on 
monetary policy. 
Comparing our results of macroeconomics variables to the established studies done 
on the effects of monetary policy in Malaysia, we found consistency with the results 
of others. Almost all agree that contractionary monetary policy decreases output. On 
the other hand, Fung (2002), Manap and Kassim (2007), Raghavan et al. (2010), 
found the presence of price puzzle when studying the effects of monetary policy 
shocks. As pointed by Chua (2012), prize puzzle in Malaysia could be eliminated by 
using data-rich methodology. We found no presence of prize puzzle in our results, in 
line with the finding by Chua (2012), who also uses FAVAR methodology to examine 




Figure 1-6: Aggregate Macroeconomic Response to Monetary Policy Shock 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. The monetary policy 
shock is normalized to 100 basis point increase of policy rate. 30000 Gibbs replications draw, and 
20000 burn-in draws were used to generate impulse response. 
 
 
1.3.2 DISAGGREGATED BANK LOANS 
Breaking the loans into conventional and Islamic loans, we could see a difference of 
responses between these two, although both are showing negative responses. Islamic 
loans appear to be more responsive to the contractionary monetary shocks compared 
to the conventional counterpart. The same results were found in Kassim et al. (2009) 
and Akhatova et al. (2016) for Malaysia. Ergeç and Arslan (2013) and Aysan et al. 
(2017) also found similar results for Turkey. Figure 1-7 shows the response of Islamic 
and conventional loan for the 36-month horizon. 1 per cent increase in monetary 
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policy decreases Islamic loan immediately, reaching 1 per cent decrease after 2 years. 
There is a bit delayed reaction from the conventional loan before being significantly 
negative. This suggests the higher capacity of the conventional banks to guard their 
lending against contractionary monetary policy. The possible explanations for this as 
given by literature includes: 
 Islamic banks rely too heavily on their deposits as a source of financing. 
(Sukmana and Kassim, 2010).  
 Islamic banks are less developed in term of the money market. This means 
they have limited access to alternative sources of funding (Farooq and Zaheer, 
2015).  
 Islamic banks are relatively smaller in size, hence, more affected by monetary 
shocks (Kishan and Opiela, 2000). 
 
Figure 1-7: Total Conventional and Islamic Loan Responses to Monetary Policy Shock 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. The monetary policy 
shock is normalized to 100 basis point increase of policy rate. 30000 Gibbs replications draw, and 
20000 burn-in draw were used to generate impulse response.  
 
Next, we look at the sectoral lending of both types of banks. Detail descriptions of 
each sectors are provided in Appendix 1-A. We present the decomposition of 
conventional and Islamic loans according to their sectors in Figure 1-8 and Figure 1-
9 from 2006 to 2018. The household sector contributes to the most significant fraction 
of both conventional and Islamic loan. The other important sectors for both banks are 
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manufacturing, ‘wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels’ (WRHR), 
construction, real estate, and ‘finance, insurance, and business activities’ (FIB). 
 
Figure 1-8:Decomposition of Islamic Loans into Sectors 
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We are mostly interested in the response of household sector, as it is the biggest 
contributor to both types of banks. As shown in Figure 1-10, the household sector for 
both banks responded negatively, and Islamic household loan reached maximum 
impact faster than the conventional counterpart. On impact, Islamic household loan 
decreases by 0.5 per cent, while conventional household loan decreases by less than 
0.1 per cent. 
Agriculture, mining, and construction sector show an insignificant response for both 
banks. Utilities and real estate loans for both banks follow the expectation of 
responding negatively to monetary policy shocks. As for manufacturing, conventional 
banks shows a positive response for the first year and Islamic banks show a negative 
response after 2 years. This is contrary with the findings from Ibrahim (2005) and 
Karim et al. (2006) where loans for manufacturing decreases as a response to 
monetary policy shocks. This is probably due to loans reclassifications or different 
methodology adopted. Most importantly, we found the evidence of heterogeneity 
across sectors from both type of bank. This suggests that monetary policy is not 
transmitted in the same manner across sectors. A hypothetical situation where 
economy is in downturn, and the central bank of Malaysia decided to lower the 
interest rate to increase output, loans in agriculture and mining sectors are not 







Figure 1-10: Sectoral Loan Response to Monetary Policy Shock 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. The monetary policy 
shock is normalized to 100 basis point increase of policy rate. 30000 Gibbs replications draw, and 
20000 burn-in draw were used to generate impulse response.  
 
 
Next, we look at the responses of the bank lending based on the purposes of the loans. 
Detail descriptions on each purpose are provided in Appendix 1-B. We rerun the 
model by replacing the sectoral loans with loans by purposes. The impulse response 
results for macroeconomic variables for purposes model are reported in Appendix 1-
G. As shown in Figure 1-11 and 1-12, the distributions of loans across purposes are 
more dispersed compared to loans across sectors. Loans to purchase passenger cars, 
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residential property, non-residential property, and working capital makes up the most 
out of total loans for both banks.  
 
Figure 1-11: Decomposition of Islamic Loans into Purposes 
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Responses of loans across purposes again suggest heterogeneity for both banks. Loans 
for both residential and non-residential properties responded negatively to monetary 
policy shock. For passenger cars, Islamic loan shows immediate negative response 
while the result for a conventional loan is not significant. As for working capital and 
fixed asset, both banks show positive response. Interestingly, both purposes are 
similar in the sense that firms must use it for productions and operations.  
We can also see contrasting responses of loans to purchase securities, passenger cars, 
and personal use. These purposes are similar in the sense that the consumption could 
be postponed or cancelled, unlike working capital and fixed assets. These purposes 
are also on a shorter-term with less amount compared to the purchase of residential 
and non-residential properties.  
We argue that conventional banks could be taking advantage of the situation where 
Islamic banks must lower the supply during contractionary monetary policy due to 
the reasons given above. Conventional banks could make extra profit by offering 
more loans to the customers that could not get the loans for these purposes from 




Figure 1-13: Loans by Purposes Response to Monetary Policy Shock 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. The monetary policy 
shock is normalized to 100 basis point increase of policy rate. 30000 Gibbs replications draw and 















1.3.3 VARIANCE DECOMPOSITIONS 
 
We look at forecast error variance decompositions to determine the contribution of 
the monetary policy shocks to the loans provided by each type of banks in Malaysia. 
Forecast error variance decomposition determines the fraction of the forecasting error 
of a variable, at a given horizon, that is attributed to any particular shock. This is an 
essential exercise as it shows how much of the forecast error is attributed to the 
monetary policy shock. 
Table 1-3 reports the results for forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD) for 
the horizon of 6, 12, 24, and 36 months ahead the forecast error owes to the monetary 
policy shocks. The contribution of the monetary policy shock to the forecast error of 
total loan is 17.48% after 36 months. This may suggest a significant impact of the 
monetary policy shock in affecting the total loan movement in Malaysia. 
Decomposing the loan into Islamic and conventional loans, we could see contrasting 
results. Forecast variance of conventional loan is more significantly explained by 
monetary policy shocks (18 per cent on the first year and 17 per cent on the third year) 
compared to Islamic loans (6 per cent on first and third year). This suggests that there 
are other more important shocks that could influence the movement of Islamic loans 
(e.g., demand shock).  
As for sectoral analysis of the variance decompositions, for conventional loans, 
Manufacturing, Restaurants and Hotels, Construction, Transport, Storage and 
Communication, and Others recorded forecast error of more than 10 per cent that are 
attributed to monetary policy shock. The results for same sectors show the same 
behaviour for Islamic loans except for Manufacturing, which is lower than 10 per 
cent. This result suggests that movement of most of the sectors of loans from both 
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Islamic and conventional banks are affected largely by other shocks, compared to 
monetary policy shock and the movement of sectoral loans that are largely explained 
by monetary policy shock are generally the same for both banks. 
Looking at the results for purposes of loans, only Securities, Construction, and 
Working Capital shows more than 10 per cent of forecast error due to monetary policy 
shock, for commercial banks. Contrasting results is obtained for Islamic banks where 
Residential Property, Non-Residential, and Personal Use are the only purposes with 
more than 10 per cent forecast error due to monetary policy shock. This is in line with 
the results for sectoral loans where the movement of most purposes of loans from both 
banks are affected largely by other shocks. Although, the purposes are different for 
Islamic and conventional loans. 
The last column on Table 1-3 gives the R2 for the regression of the estimated factors 
plus the interest rate on each variable. It shows how well each variable represented by 
the factors and the observable variable in our VAR. Output level, price level, and loan 
variables shows R2 values of higher than 70 per cent which indicates that they are well 
represented by our model. However, observing the R2 of each sectoral loans and loans 
by purposes, we could see that amount of variation explained by the factors are much 
lower, with only a few of R2 being greater than 70%, such as Household (Islamic), 







Variables 6 12 24 36 R2 
Policy Rate 9.2697 6.9297 6.7226 6.8017 100* 
Industrial Production 
Index 
2.2579 2.3436 2.4092 2.4206 74.4013 
Consumer Price Index 12.6057 12.3545 12.258 12.2812 90.0335 
Total Loan 19.2898 18.2865 17.7668 17.4845 75.5924 
Total Islamic Loan 6.07 6.095 6.3688 6.458 70.1318 
Total Conventional Loan 20.7766 19.4563 19.0878 18.7496 77.8654 
*Sectoral*      
Agriculture (Conventional) 3.1581 3.9163 4.5636 4.6499 31.6528 
Mining (Conventional) 2.8253 3.1282 3.3971 3.4599 15.558 
Manufacturing 
(Conventional) 
15.1927 14.8778 14.6352 14.5795 48.3078 
Utilities (Conventional) 5.1847 5.2246 5.3262 5.4454 12.4802 
Wholesale and Retail Trade, 
Restaurants and Hotels 
(Conventional) 
25.1596 24.6127 23.5986 23.4128 34.3995 
Construction (Conventional) 11.2001 11.7234 11.2744 11.1878 5.2799 
Real Estate (Conventional) 3.2679 3.6956 4.3001 4.4351 33.0576 
Transport, Storage and 
Communication 
(Conventional) 
22.7374 22.4706 22.3228 22.2681 44.5671 
Finance, insurance, and 
business activities 
(Conventional) 
4.3948 4.8321 5.2295 5.2553 12.0791 
Education & Health 
(Conventional) 
8.7297 8.7501 8.9139 8.8719 48.5168 
Household (Conventional) 6.3201 6.9008 7.5223 7.7159 63.7209 
Others (Conventional) 17.6829 18.7168 18.2357 18.1089 8.7429 
Agriculture (Islamic) 6.36 6.7628 6.9722 7.0649 17.6459 
Mining (Islamic) 9.7175 9.9649 9.8906 9.9895 13.8458 
Manufacturing (Islamic) 5.5417 5.6232 5.7147 5.6871 23.9116 
Utilities (Islamic) 3.4486 3.8927 4.4283 4.5224 14.8129 
Wholesale and Retail Trade, 
Restaurants and Hotels 
(Islamic) 
14.9151 14.6808 14.4762 14.4209 28.0133 
Construction (Islamic) 11.0741 11.8703 11.8339 11.6808 13.1598 
Real Estate (Islamic) 3.4896 3.8621 3.9487 4.0774 22.8964 
Transport, Storage and 
Communication (Islamic) 
21.3788 21.1153 20.7693 20.6289 45.1109 
Finance, insurance, and 
business activities (Islamic) 
3.5718 3.8887 4.1177 4.2352 18.4576 
Education & Health 
(Islamic) 
2.696 3.4185 3.7101 3.8451 25.0158 
Household (Islamic) 2.1393 3.316 4.0892 4.2421 74.2907 
Others (Islamic) 9.7940 10.5358 10.5795 10.4694 9.3674 
*Purposes*      
Securities (Conventional) 19.0898 18.6700 18.2715 18.0608 49.6185 
Other Transport Vehicles 
(Conventional) 6.5455 7.3311 7.8756 7.9347 25.8586 
Passenger Cars 




(Conventional) 9.4226 8.9407 8.7031 8.7734 51.5910 
Non-Residential 
(Conventional) 4.7765 5.6991 6.4045 6.5913 70.5203 
Fixed Assets (Conventional) 3.8608 4.4872 4.6634 4.8943 26.4169 
Personal Use (Conventional) 6.5311 7.0048 7.1565 7.1472 13.5626 
Credit Card (Conventional) 6.8817 7.7534 8.2536 8.3333 65.1323 
Consumer Durables 
(Conventional) 5.0886 5.3021 5.5265 5.8678 3.5417 
Construction (Conventional) 13.4322 14.1427 13.2706 12.6112 25.8394 
Working Capital 
(Conventional) 20.0089 19.1575 18.7837 18.6640 34.3656 
Other Purposes 
(Conventional) 7.3544 7.3072 7.3966 7.5541 29.9067 
Securities (Islamic) 8.4618 8.4064 8.3665 8.5063 45.0748 
Other Transport Vehicles 
(Islamic) 4.2174 4.4767 4.6017 4.6518 22.1312 
Passenger Cars (Islamic) 1.8288 2.6313 3.4431 3.8015 66.1855 
Residential Property 
(Islamic) 28.7229 23.1342 17.6951 16.8726 71.2581 
Non-Residential (Islamic) 11.2133 10.8625 10.5425 10.5002 30.8210 
Fixed Assets (Islamic) 6.9043 7.9728 8.2239 8.1505 31.6285 
Personal Use (Islamic) 13.5466 13.4918 13.1006 13.0046 73.9828 
Credit Card (Islamic) 4.1882 4.6792 5.0694 5.1576 34.1759 
Consumer Durables 
(Islamic) 3.6203 3.7227 3.8959 4.0132 9.2107 
Construction (Islamic) 4.4369 4.9643 5.1675 5.2269 22.5670 
Working Capital (Islamic) 2.6241 3.1357 3.3272 3.4191 20.3481 
Other Purposes (Islamic) 8.9220 9.6788 9.1164 8.9207 27.6480 






















We evaluate the robustness of our results by running the baseline model with few 
adjustments. This discussion will be based only on the results of the main 
macroeconomic variables. First, we look at the responses of macroeconomic variables 
when we replace the sectors of loans to purposes of loans. Given that 24 variables out 
of 118 are changed now7, we expect there would be some differences in the results. 
The impulse response result is shown in Appendix 1-G. The signs of the responses 
are similar except for the shape of the responses of CPI inflation and 5-Year 
Government Securities.  
 Next, as discussed in 1.3.4 under the Data section, we change the proxy of monetary 
policy from the overnight interbank rate to the 3 months interbank rate. The responses 
look very similar as reported in Appendix 1-E; thus, our results are robust in this sense 
as well. We also look if adding more factors into the VAR could change our results 
significantly. For this practice, we use 12 factors instead of 10 and reported the results 
in Appendix 1-F. The only thing noticeable is total loan takes 2 months longer to be 
significant.  
Considering that Malaysia is a small open economy, we also introduce extra 
observable variables to the VAR to capture the international movement and to see if 
it will significantly affect our baseline results. We added Real Effective Exchange 
Rate, world oil price, and US interest rate as the additional observable variable. For 
Real Effective Exchange Rate, we ordered it last in VAR ordering under the 
assumption that it is affected contemporaneously by other shocks. As for world oil 
price and US interest rate, we ordered them first in the VAR ordering as they are 
                                                             
7 12 classifications of Islamic and conventional banks each. 
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assumed to not contemporaneously be affected by any domestic variables. The model 
with effective exchange rate in VAR shows price level decreases for the first 8 months 
and increases after 19 months, after a monetary policy shock. The downward response 
of effective exchange rate to monetary shocks is not too severe as in other models. 
We believe that this does not hinder the credibility of our main model as the signs are 
still similar.  The results are reported in Appendix 1-H. Results for adding world oil 
price are consistent with our benchmark model, except that response of price level 
takes a little longer to be significantly negative and response of 5 year government 
securities is only positively significant for the first 3 months. The results are reported 
in Appendix 1-I. 
Finally, given that all our main model and models in our robustness checks exhibit 
exchange rate puzzle, we attempted to include the US interest rate to the VAR and 
report the results in Appendix 1-J. We managed to eliminate the exchange rate puzzle, 
at least, for 2 months, along with price puzzle. Government Securities first exhibits 
positive response then changes to negative response after 3 months.  
All the results from these models are presented in the Appendix section. Overall, the 
benchmark model is robust against the results of other models described above. The 
general direction of the movement of the variables is mostly identical to what we 
obtained earlier, except when we ordered the US interest rate last, where we 








This study investigates the effects of monetary policy shocks on disaggregated loans 
from both Islamic and conventional banks in Malaysia. This chapter employed the 
FAVAR approach that combines principal component analysis with VAR. Unlike the 
traditional VAR model that relies on a few variables, the advantage of the FAVAR 
model is that it uses factors that are derived from large information set. Recent studies 
(Lagana and Mountford, 2005; and Mumtaz and Surico, 2009) have shown that this 
approach provides more reliable and accurate estimates because the model is 
estimated based on a data-rich environment. This approach also offers the advantage 
of the impulse response function that can be generated for every variable in the 
dataset. 
The results confirm recent findings of how Islamic banks are more responsive 
compared to conventional banks to monetary policy shock. This means that they could 
propagate the monetary transmission better than the conventional ones.  We also 
found heterogenous results from different sectors and purposes for both banks. This 
could mean that there is still some room left for the central bank of Malaysia to 
improve the effectiveness of monetary transmission mechanism in Malaysia via bank 
lending channel, especially on the sectors or purposes that does not respond 
accordingly to the expectation of monetary policy.  
This could also signal that, if monetary policy stances could not affect these sectors 
or purposes accordingly, policy makers in Malaysia should attempt other measures to 




1.5 APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1 
1.5.1 APPENDIX 1-A: DEFINITIONS OF 




Loans for agricultural activities, agricultural services, livestock farming, 
cultivation of crops, timber extraction, poultry, forest management, farming, 
fishing and  
Mining and 
Quarrying 
Loans for activities of mining, quarrying, and oil and gas production. 
Manufacturing Loans for manufacturing and production of goods.  
Examples:   
 processing of rubber, food, palm oil. 
 manufacture of leather goods, chemical products, wood products, 
coal, rubber, food, and plastic products. 
Utilities Loans for firms in the activities of generation and distribution of electrical 
energy with intent to sell to households and commercial users 
Also includes loans for firms in the production and distribution of 





Loans for firms involved in the business of wholesale trade, retail trade, and 
restaurants and hotels. 
Construction Loans for firms in general contracting including construction of industrial 
buildings, civil engineering work, construction of infrastructure, special 
contracting work, construction of commercial complexes, and construction 
of residential houses. 
Real Estate  Loans for firms involved in operating real estate services. (renting, buying, 





Loans for firms involved in the provision of transport, storage and 




Loans for firms involved in: 
 Finance - banking institutions and non-bank financial institutions. 
 Insurance - general insurance services. 
 Business Services - provision of auditing services, legal services, 
accounting, and data collection. 
Education, health 
and others 
Loans for institutions involved in health, education, social work, and other 
community services or activities. 
Household Sector Total loans by purpose to households 






1.5.2 APPENDIX 1-B: DEFINITIONS OF 
PURPOSES OF LOANS 
Purchase of 
Securities 




Loans granted to purchase motor vehicles other than passenger cars. 
Purchase of 
Passenger Cars 
Loans granted to purchase motor vehicles which are used mainly to transport a 
limited number of people. 
Residential 
Property 
Loans granted to purchase or refinance the residential property. 
Non-Residential 
Property 
Loans granted to purchase or refinance the non-residential property. It includes 
land, factories, industrial buildings, commercial complexes, and warehouses. 
Purchase of 
Fixed Assets  
Loans granted to purchase fixed assets, other than land or building, that are used 
or to be used for the business activity.  
Personal Uses Loans granted to individuals for private use only. 




Loans granted to purchase consumer durable goods such as washing machines, 
refrigerators, and televisions. 
Constructions Loans granted to general contracting works include constructions by household 
Working Capital Loans granted to businesses to fund its daily business operations (e.g., 
receivables financing, purchasing inventory, and operating expenses). 











1.5.3 APPENDIX 1-C: DATA 
The transformation codes are: 1 – no transformation; 2 – first difference; 4 – 









IPI IPI 5 1 
IPI Mining IPIM 5 1 
IPI Electricity IPIE 5 1 
IPI Manufacturing IPIMA 5 1 
IPI Electronics IPIEI 5 1 
IPI Electricals products IPIEL 5 1 
IPI Chemicals and chemical products IPIC 5 1 
IPI Petroleum products IPIP 5 1 
IPI Textiles wearing apparel and footwear IPIT 5 1 
IPI Wood and wood products IPIW 5 1 
IPI Rubber products IPIR 5 1 
IPI Paper products IPIPA 5 1 
IPI Non-metallic mineral products IPINM 5 1 
IPI Iron and steel IPIIS 5 1 
IPI Fabricated metal products IPIFM 5 1 
IPI Food products IPIF 5 1 
IPI Transport equipment IPITE 5 1 
IPI Beverages IPIB 5 1 
IPI Tobacco products IPITO 5 1 
Interbank Money Market (Overnight) MMO 1 0 
Interbank Money Market (1 week) MM1W 1 0 
Interbank Money Market (1 month) MM1M 1 0 
Interbank Money Market (3 months) MM3M 1 0 
Interest Rate: Fixed Account 1 month IRF1 1 0 
Interest Rate: Fixed Account 3 month IRF3 1 0 
Interest Rate: Fixed Account 6 month IRF6 1 0 
Interest Rate: Fixed Account 9 month IRF9 1 0 
Interest Rate: Fixed Account 12 month IRF12 1 0 
Interest Rate: Savings deposit IRSD 1 0 
Interest Rate: Base Lending Rate  BLR 1 0 
Interest Rate: Average Financing Rate AFR 1 0 
Malaysian Government Securities (1 year) GS1 1 0 
Malaysian Government Securities (2 years) GS2 1 0 
Malaysian Government Securities (3 years) GS3 1 0 
Malaysian Government Securities (4 years) GS4 1 0 
Malaysian Government Securities (5 years) GS5 1 0 
Malaysian Government Securities (10 years) GS10 1 0 
Malaysian Government Securities (15 years) GS15 1 0 
Malaysian Government Securities (20 years) GS20 1 0 
Narrow Quasi-Money NQM 5 1 
M1 M1 5 1 
M2 M2 5 1 
M3 M3 5 1 
Total Reserve Money TRM 5 1 
Currency in Circulation CIC 5 1 
Required Reserves RR 5 1 
Excess Reserves ER 5 1 
Purchase of securities (Islamic Loan) LSI 5 1 
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Purchase of Vehicle (Islamic Loan) LVI 5 1 
Purchase of residential property (Islamic Loan) LRI 5 1 
Purchase of non-residential property (Islamic Loan) LNRI 5 1 
Personal use (Islamic Loan) LPI 5 1 
Construction (Islamic Loan) LCI 5 1 
Primary agriculture (Islamic Loan) LAI 5 1 
Mining and quarrying (Islamic Loan) LMQI 5 1 
Manufacturing (Islamic Loan) LMI 5 1 
Utilities (Islamic Loan) LUI 5 1 




Real estate (Islamic Loan) LREI 5 1 
Transport, storage and communications (Islamic Loan) LTI 5 1 
Finance, insurance and business activities (Islamic Loan) LFI 5 1 
Islamic Loan Total LI 5 1 
Purchase of securities (Conventional) LSC 5 1 
Purchase of Vehicle (Conventional) LVC 5 1 
Purchase of residential property (Conventional) LRC 5 1 
Purchase of non-residential property (Conventional) LNRC 5 1 
Personal use (Conventional) LPC 5 1 
Construction (Conventional) LCC 5 1 
Primary agriculture (Conventional) LAC 5 1 
Mining and quarrying (Conventional) LMQC 5 1 
Manufacturing (Conventional) LMC 5 1 
Electricity, gas and water supply (Conventional) LUC 5 1 




Real estate (Conventional) LREC 5 1 
Transport, storage and communications (Conventional) LTC 5 1 
Finance, insurance and business activities (Conventional) LFC 5 1 
Conventional Loan Total LC 5 1 
Demand Deposit (Conventional Banks) DDC 5 1 
Saving Deposit (Conventional Banks) SDC 5 1 
Demand Deposit (Islamic Banks) DDI 5 1 
Saving Deposit (Islamic Banks) SDI 5 1 
External Reserve (Special Drawing Rights) ERSR 5 1 
External Reserve (IMF reserves position) ERIF 5 1 
External Reserve (Gold and foreign exchange) ERGF 5 1 
Total External Reserve TER 5 1 
Bankruptcy BKRP 4 1 
All groups (CPI) CPI 5 1 
Food (CPI) CPIF 5 1 
Beverages and tobacco (CPI) CPIBT 5 1 
Clothing and footwear (CPI) CPICF 5 1 
Gross rent, fuel and power (CPI) CPIGFP 5 1 




Medical care and health expenses (CPI) CPIMH 5 1 
Miscellaneous goods and services (CPI) CPIM 5 1 
Employee Provident Fund Contribution EPFC 5 1 
Employee Provident Fund Withdrawal EPFW 5 1 
Rubber Price PR 5 1 
Palm oil Price PPO 5 1 
Saw logs Price PSA 5 1 
Tin Price PT 5 1 
Crude oil Price PCO 5 1 
Liquefied natural gas Price PLNG 5 1 
Gross exports   GE 5 1 
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Gross imports GI 5 1 
Leading Index LEAI 2 1 
Coincident Index CI 2 1 
Lagging Index LAGI 2 1 
Composite Index COI 5 0 
Market Capitalisation (RM billion) MC 5 1 
FBM EMAS Index FBME 5 0 
Stock Market Turnover (RM Million) SMT 5 1 
Net P/E Ratio (Composite Index) PER 1 1 
Foreign Exchange (USD) (Real Efective) FXUSD 5 0 
Foreign Exchange (GBP) FXGBP 2 0 
Foreign Exchange (SGD) FXSGD 2 0 
Foreign Exchange (JPY) FXJPY 2 0 
Foreign Exchange (HKD) FXHKD 2 0 














1.5.4 APPENDIX 1-D: VARIABILITY 
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Figure 1-14: Scree Plot for Purposes Model 
 
Factors Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative Proportion 
1 14.51 12.84 %  12.84 %  
2 8.41 7.44 %  20.28 %  
3 7.9 6.99 %  27.27 %  
4 5.96 5.28 %  32.55 %  
5 5.54 4.90 %  37.45 %  
6 4.41 3.90 %  41.35 %  
7 3.86 3.42 %  44.77 %  
8 3.55 3.15 %  47.91 %  
9 3.04 2.69 %  50.60 %  
10 2.86 2.53 %  53.14 %  
11 2.58 2.28 %  55.42 %  
12 2.34 2.08 %  57.49 %  
13 2.29 2.02 %  59.52 %  
14 2.21 1.95 %  61.47 %  
15 2.09 1.85 %  63.32 %  







      
       Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
      
      0 NA  5.05E-16 -4.00511 -3.7772 -3.9125 
1 1283.173 1.54E-19 -12.108  -9.373087*  -10.99667* 
2 296.2919   7.25e-20* -12.8848 -7.64286 -10.7547 
3 175.6489 8.44E-20 -12.804 -5.05498 -9.65515 
4   156.9256* 1.06E-19 -12.7129 -2.45694 -8.54539 
5 137.2712 1.52E-19 -12.5985 0.164565 -7.41218 
6 137.7367 1.99E-19 -12.7185 2.551571 -6.51346 
7 139.0684 2.29E-19 -13.1657 4.611387 -5.94193 
8 103.927 4.38E-19  -13.39795* 6.886144 -5.15546 
      
      




























Figure 1-15: Aggregate Macroeconomic Response to Monetary Policy Shocks (3 Month 
Interbank Rate Model) 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. The monetary policy 
shock is normalized to 100 basis point increase of policy rate. 30000 Gibbs replications draw, and 













Figure 1-16: Aggregate Macroeconomic Response to Monetary Policy Shocks (12 Factors) 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. The monetary policy 
shock is normalized to 100 basis point increase of policy rate. 30000 Gibbs replications draw, and 











Figure 1-17: Aggregate Macroeconomic Response to Monetary Policy Shocks (Purposes Model) 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. The monetary policy 
shock is normalized to 100 basis point increase of policy rate. 30000 Gibbs replications draw, and 
















Figure 1-18: Aggregate Macroeconomic Response to Monetary Policy Shocks (Effective 
Exchange Rate Model) 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. The monetary policy 
shock is normalized to 100 basis point increase of policy rate. 30000 Gibbs replications draw and 











Figure 1-19: Aggregate Macroeconomic Response to Monetary Policy Shocks (World Oil Price 
Model) 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. The monetary policy 
shock is normalized to 100 basis point increase of policy rate. 30000 Gibbs replications draw, and 









Figure 1-20: Aggregate Macroeconomic Response to Monetary Policy Shocks (US Interest Rate 
Model) 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. The monetary policy 
shock is normalized to 100 basis point increase of policy rate. 30000 Gibbs replications draw, and 






2 CHAPTER 2: THE EFFECTS 
OF CREDIT SUPPLY 













Following the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, there has been a renewed interest in 
the nexus between the financial sector and the real economy.  Specifically, the interest 
on credit supply shocks. As defined by (Abildgren, 2012), credit supply shock is 
“shocks that can affect the ability and willingness of monetary and financial 
institutions to supply credit to non-financial firms and households”. 
Credit supply shocks could be explained by several reasons, such as changes in bank 
funding, unexpected changes in bank capital, changes in risk perception of potential 
borrowers, change in the structure of the industry, and changes in the degree of 
competition among banks (Gambetti and Musso, 2016). Peersman (2012) gave an 
example of innovation in the banking structure that makes it more profitable for banks 
to securitize their loans. This innovation will motivate banks to actively sell more 
loans in the secondary market, and this increases their ability to supply new loans 
independently of monetary policy changes.  
Recently, academicians are trying to find the effects of this shock on the real 
economy, especially after the recent financial crisis where credit growth dropped 
independently of monetary policy, along with the drop in output, and attempted to 
find out how much does credit supply shocks are accounted for to the economic 
slowdown. These studies are mostly done in the context of advanced economies. 
Among others are Busch et al. (2010) for UK, Lucchetta and Nicoló (2010) for G-7, 
Moccero et al. (2014) for Euro Area, Gambetti and Musso (2016) for US, UK, and 




Malaysia only experienced a slight drop in output during the recent financial crisis 
compared to other advanced economies during the Asian Financial crisis. As shown 
in Figure 2-1, the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis is much more significant than 
the recent Global Financial Crisis. 
 
Figure 2-1: Annual GDP Growth for Malaysia, UK, US, And Euro Area 
 
 
The lack of a clear relationship between households and non-financial corporations’ 
loans and output might be the reason for the nonexistence of studies on credit supply 
shocks in Malaysia so far. Especially during the Global Financial Crisis in 2009, 
where there was a big drop in GDP growth, reaching -6 per cent but the loans growth 
only dropped from 12 to 4 per cent. This observation is very different from the 
countries extensively studied on this subject matter where the loan growth dropped 
massively during this period for those economies (e.g., US, UK, Euro Area). 
Interestingly, before the drop of the loan growth, there was a huge spike from 2007 
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Figure 2-2: Quarterly GDP Growth and Loans to Households and Non-Financial Corporations 
Growth in Malaysia 
 
There are numbers of studies in Malaysia has attempted to link the financial sector to 
the real economy. One strand of literature extensively studied is the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth, (Choong et al., 2003; Ang, 
2008; Anwar and Sun, 2008; Majid, 2008; Noor and Ramli, 2017). Another strand is 
bank lending and macroeconomics variables in Malaysia (Tang, 2000; and 
Vaithilingam et al., 2003). But none of the studies on financial sector in Malaysia so 
far has specifically identified and examined the effects of credit supply shocks.  
The Asian financial crisis in 1998 left a severe impact on Malaysia’s economy and 
banking system. In an attempt to curb further damage, the central bank of Malaysia 
introduced a new financial restructuring framework which is a ten-year Financial 




The first phase focused on strengthening the financial infrastructure and increasing 
the capacity of the domestic banks in Malaysian. The second phase focused on 
increasing the degree of competitions in the domestic financial sector. Lastly, the third 
phase introduced new foreign competition and focused on integration into the global 
financial sector.  
Within these phases of Financial Sector Master Plan, various innovations were 
introduced such as removing controls on the interest rate, issuance of new foreign 
banking licenses, and regulations on staff remuneration. Financial Sector Blueprint 
was introduced later in 2011 to guide a new pathway for financial restructuring in 
Malaysia. Within this new framework, there are more innovations implemented 
within the financial structure of Malaysia. Some of these innovations during the 
restructuring process could be translated into credit supply shocks according to the 
definition given earlier. 
The contribution of this chapter to the existing literature is twofold. First, to the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first study to identify credit supply shocks and study its 
impact in Malaysia. Second, we contribute to the literature of credit supply shocks by 
separating households and non-financial firms, given that the growth rate of 
household and non-financial corporations exhibits strong heterogeneity and equal 
proportion to the total private non-financial corporations’ loans, and show the 
different responses and variance decomposition between these two. 
Accordingly, this chapter aims to identify credit supply shocks for Malaysia and 
analyse their macroeconomic effects using Bayesian Structural VAR framework. For 




The main results show that credit supply shock is important for the business cycle in 
Malaysia as well as to credit growth, but at the expense of higher inflation.  
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical 
approach and describes the data. Section 3 discusses the results and sensitivity 

























In this section, we present the methodology to uncover credit supply shocks in 
Malaysia. We start with the brief descriptions on SVAR and summary of Arias et al. 
(2014) algorithm for the identification of the shocks. Next, we discuss the 
identification scheme and the reasoning behind each restriction. Finally, we discuss 
the data for the model and followed by the lag length criteria to choose the number of 
lags in our system.  
The application of SVAR with sign restrictions to identify credit supply shocks is 
widely used by studies on this subject matter such as Busch et al. (2010), Peersman 
(2012), Bijsterbosch and Falagiarda (2015), Gambetti and Musso (2016), and Mumtaz 
et al. (2018).  Mumtaz et al. (2018) show evidence that VAR models with sign 
restrictions are able to capture credit supply shocks judiciously well in simulations. 
With this justification, we decide to follow sign restrictions approach in SVAR 
framework to identify credit supply shocks and examine its effects in Malaysia.  
2.2.1 SVAR WITH SIGN RESTRICTIONS 
We start the model with reduced-form VAR where every series is regressed on its 
lags and the lags of the other series: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐾 + 𝐴1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝑌𝑡−2+. . . +𝐴𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜇𝑡                                                     (2-1) 
where 𝑌𝑡 is the matrix of endogenous variables, 𝑡 =  1, . . . , 𝑇. 𝑇 is the sample size, 
𝜇𝑡  ∼  𝑁(0, 𝛴) is the reduced-form error terms, 𝑝 is the lag, and 𝐾, 𝐴1, . . . , 𝐴𝑝 and 𝛴 
are matrices of the model’s parameters. 𝐾 is the vector of constant terms, 𝐴𝑖 , 𝑖 =
1, . . . , 𝑝 is an n × n matrix of the AR coefficients, whereas 𝛴 =  𝐸(𝜇𝑡𝜇𝑡′) is the n × n 
covariance matrix of the error term vector 𝜇𝑡. The error terms are the unpredictable 
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factor of 𝑌𝑡, given the variables included and considering the lagged values of the 
included series, which has no economic interpretation without further assumptions. 
To solve that, we could use the structural form instead of Equation (2-1) as follows: 
𝐵0𝑌𝑡 = 𝑘 + 𝐵1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝑌𝑡−2+. . . +𝐵𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜑𝑡                                                  (2-2) 
where 𝑘, 𝐵1, . . . , 𝐵𝑝 are defined the same as 𝐾, 𝐴1, . . . , 𝐴𝑝,  n × n matrix 𝐵0 is the 
contemporaneous reactions of the variables to the structural shocks, and the n × 1 
vector of structural shocks (or structural innovations) 𝜑𝑡 with zero mean and with a 
diagonal covariance matrix 𝛴𝜑, also shows that the number of variables matches the 
number of shocks. 
We can recover the structural shocks from the reduced-form VAR by multiplying 
both sides of Equation (2-2) by 𝐵0





−1𝐵2𝑌𝑡−2+. . . +𝐵0
−1𝐵𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐵0
−1𝜑𝑡          (2-3) 
Yielding the results of: 
𝐾 = 𝐵0
−1𝑘                                                                                                              (2-4) 
 𝐴𝑖 = 𝐵0
−1𝐵𝑖                                                                                                           (2-5) 
𝜇𝑡 = 𝐵0
−1𝜑𝑡                                                                                                           (2-6) 
𝐸(𝜇𝑡𝜇𝑡
′ ) = 𝛴 = 𝐵0
−1𝐵0
−1′                                                                                       (2-7) 
The model is estimated using Bayesian methods with Minnesota prior. We select the 
hyperparameters by using grid search to obtain the combinations that maximizes the 
marginal likelihood. Shocks are identified by imposing sign restrictions on the 
contemporaneous impulse response functions. The estimation is done by using BEAR 
Toolbox from the European Central Bank by Dieppe et al. (2016), in which the sign 
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restrictions on the impulse response function procedure follows the algorithm from 
Arias et al. (2014). 
2.2.2 SHOCKS IDENTIFICATION 
As we have five endogenous variables in our baseline model, we could identify five 
structural shocks at most. However, identifying all these five shocks involves 
complicated identification restrictions and will increase the computational burden 
(Busch et al. 2010). However, identifying a much smaller number of shocks may 
result in a large number of unexplained movements. Following Bijsterbosch and 
Falagiarda (2015) and Gambetti and Musso (2016) for the same variables chosen, we 
identify four shocks: aggregate demand, aggregate supply, credit supply, and 
monetary policy shocks. We leave one shock unidentified so that this shock could act 
as a buffer and could capture the effects of omitted variables. All the restrictions are 
imposed on impact period only and shown in Table 2-1. We imposed restrictions to 
identify the structural shocks as follows8: 
Expansionary aggregate demand shock is assumed to increase output, inflation, 
lending rate, and policy rate on impact. Theoretical literature agrees that aggregate 
demand shocks drive output growth and inflation in the same direction. However, the 
impact on loan growth does not seem to be clear. For example, an expansionary 
aggregate demand shock may induce people to increase consumption. Thus, the loan 
growth could increase, but consumers may also withdraw more from their bank 
deposits to increase their consumption. This leads to a decrease in bank’s funds and 
the loan growth could not expand or could even decrease. Following this reason, we 
                                                             
8 Gambetti and Musso (2016) presents the sign restrictions of past literatures. Their restrictions were 
imposed based on the common restrictions between these literatures and considered robust. See Table 
II in the main paper and Table A-C in the Supplementary Material Annex. 
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do not put restriction on loan growth. As for the policy rate, central bank reacts to 
expansionary aggregate demand shock by raising the policy rate to avoid inflationary 
pressures in line with the monetary policy rule. This in turn increases the lending rate 
due to the linkage between lending rates and the policy rate in Malaysia. Thus, we 
restrict the policy rate and the lending rate to be positive. 
Positive aggregate supply shock increases output and decreases price level on 
impact.  Regarding loan growth, a positive aggregate supply shock that decreases 
costs may increase investment and firms may borrow more to fund these additional 
investments. However, firms may also be able to fund these higher investments 
through other means (e.g. extra funds gained as raw material cost is lower now), which 
may not increase the loan growth. Moreover, as output is increasing and price level is 
decreasing, there is no clear central bank response, so the impact on the policy rate is 
uncertain. Because of these unclear effects, the responses of loan growth, the lending 
rate, and the policy rate are left unrestricted. This restriction is sufficient as this is the 
only shock that we identified which moves the output and prices in different 
directions. 
Expansionary monetary policy shock is restricted to increase output, inflation, and 
loan growth, and decrease in the lending rate and the policy rate, on impact. The 
restrictions on output and price level are based on the standard assumption of 
monetary transmission mechanism. The decrease of the lending rate reflects the idea 
that interest rates offered by banks are tied to the policy rate in Malaysia. Lastly, the 
response of the loan growth is restricted to be positive due to bank lending channel of 
monetary transmission mechanism.  
83 
 
Expansionary credit supply shock is restricted to increase output, inflation, and loan 
growth, while decreasing the lending rate and policy rate, on impact. Banks are 
assumed to increase the availability of loan for the private sector exogenously during 
expansionary credit supply shock either by increasing the amount of the loan or 
reducing lending rate, thereby pushing up the loan above the market equilibrium and 
creating an oversupply. This oversupply of credit in the market pushes down the 
lending rate further. Thus, a credit supply shock drives the loan growth and the 
lending rate in opposite directions. Since these restrictions are not sufficient to 
differentiate credit supply shock from others that we identified, we also set restrictions 
on other variables as well. We restricted output to be positive due to positive credit 
supply shock as credit becomes less costly, firms will increase their investment and 
households will demand more for consumption. Meanwhile, as the economy expands, 
firms will increase their prices as they expect higher prices. Due to this, we restrict 
the response of inflation to be positive. This inflationary pressure would then lead the 
central bank to increase the policy rate to contain them as per monetary policy rule.  
 









GDP + + + + 
CPI + - + + 
LOAN GROWTH ? ? + + 
LENDING RATE + ? - - 
POLICY RATE + ? + - 
Table 2-1: Identification Scheme 









This section details the variables we use in the baseline scenario. We use quarterly 
data from the first quarter of 2000 until last quarter of 2018. Seasonal adjustments 
were carried out using X-12 function in Eviews 9 for output and inflation. Figure 2-3 
shows the time series employed in our baseline model. The data that we employed in 
the estimations are: 
 Real GDP 
 Consumer Price Index 
 Loans to Households and Non-Financial Corporations 
 Lending Rate9 
 Overnight Interbank Rate 
Data for real GDP was taken from International Financial Statistics (IFS). Data for 
Consumer Price Index and loans to household and non-financial firms were taken 
from Bank for International Settlements. We proxy lending rate by using average 
lending rate data from Central Bank of Malaysia, which is the weighted average 
lending rates on loans extended by the commercial banks. Lastly, we use overnight 
interbank rate data to proxy the short-term rate or policy rate and taken from Central 
Bank of Malaysia as well.  
                                                             
9 Few studies use spread in the estimation of credit supply shocks (e.g., Mumtaz et al. 2018). We 
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2.2.4 LAG SELECTION  
We carried out lag length criteria tests to choose the appropriate lag for our model. 
Based on the results in Table 2-2, Final prediction error, and Akaike information 
criterion suggests that we should use 3 lags while Schwarz information criterion and 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion suggested 2. We opted to use 2 in our baseline 
model.10 
Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 NA 28.21003 17.52906 17.60719 17.56063 
1 3003.885 2.18E-05 3.456329 3.925117 3.64572 
2 130.3246 1.46E-05 3.05208 3.911526* 3.399299* 
3 51.90403 1.42e-05* 3.024042* 4.274145 3.529086 
4 36.58935 1.48E-05 3.067885 4.708646 3.730757 
5 25.29539 1.64E-05 3.166233 5.197651 3.986931 
6 30.31482 1.76E-05 3.233851 5.655926 4.212375 
7 34.16633 1.85E-05 3.275519 6.088251 4.41187 
8 34.4283 1.93E-05 3.310268 6.513657 4.604445 
9 47.35653* 1.86E-05 3.263181 6.857228 4.715185 
10 32.39573 1.95E-05 3.298325 7.283029 4.908155 
11 33.29213 2.03E-05 3.321731 7.697092 5.089387 
12 37.39389 2.04E-05 3.311961 8.077979 5.237444 
Table 2-2: Results for Lag Selection Criteria  









                                                             




As discussed in the previous section, the SVAR model is estimated using Bayesian 
technique, and the shocks are identified using sign restrictions. Specifically, the model 
employs Minnesota prior for the SVAR coefficients and the covariance matrix, with 
5,000 iterations and 2,000 retained draws. The lag selected is 2. 
2.3.1 EFFECTS OF EXPANSIONARY CREDIT 
SUPPLY SHOCK ON MACROECONOMICS 
OF MALAYSIA 
Figure 2-4 reports the median of the responses and the 68 per cent confidence interval 
represented by the shaded area. The credit supply shock is normalized for a direct 
interpretation of the results. We normalized the effects of the credit supply shock to 
decrease the median response of lending rate by 10 basis points (0.1 per cent) on 
impact.  
GDP growth increases by 2.2 per cent on impact and the response only lasts for 2 
months. This large but short-lasting impact on GDP growth is consistent with 
Gambetti and Musso (2016) for US, UK, and Euro Area.  
Inflation increases by 2 per cent on impact and continues to be significantly positive 
but at a decreasing rate until the 4th quarter. Loan growth increases by 4.1 per cent on 
impact and becomes insignificant after 6 quarters at a decreasing rate as well. The 
lending rate continues to be responding negatively throughout the 5 years amidst the 
insignificant period between 2nd to 5th quarter. Short term rate increases by 1.3 per 
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2.3.2 THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF 
CREDIT SUPPLY SHOCKS  
Next, we report the results from variance decomposition analysis. Figure 2-5 shows 
the forecast error variance decompositions of each variable to all shocks.  
Firstly, credit supply shocks explain about 12 per cent of the forecast variance of GDP 
growth after 4 quarters and increases to 15 per cent after 5 years. Although it is not 
the biggest contributor to the forecast variance of GDP growth, we still consider 15 
per cent as substantial. Another notable result from this analysis is that the forecast 
variance of GDP growth explained by credit supply shock is slightly bigger than 
monetary policy shock (12 per cent) after 5 years, signifying that credit supply shock 
is more important in influencing the variation of GDP growth than monetary policy 
shock. 
As for the forecast error variance of credit growth, credit supply shock explains the 
biggest fraction (32 per cent in the first year and 28 per cent in the fifth year) of it, 
implying that credit supply shock is the most important factor in influencing the 
variation of credit growth. Also, monetary policy is the least important shock to 
contribute to the forecast variance of loan growth (14 per cent).  
Aggregate demand explains 23 per cent of the forecast variance of inflation and 
followed by 21 per cent each by credit supply and aggregate demand shocks on the 
5th year. Monetary policy shocks only explain 17 per cent at the same horizon. This 
result shows that credit supply shock is also important in influencing the variation of 




Forecast variance of lending rate on the 5th year is largely explained by aggregate 
demand shocks (41 per cent) and followed by aggregate supply (20 per cent). Credit 
supply shock and monetary policy shock both explain 11 per cent of the forecast 
variance of lending rate. This shows that aggregate demand is more important than 
credit supply shocks in influencing lending rate, probably due to credit demand 
shocks that is entailed together with aggregate demand shock and banks usually set 
the loan rate based on the demand for the loans. 
Forecast variance of the policy rate is explained the most by aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply shocks. Monetary policy shocks explain around 14 per cent of the 
forecast variance at year 5. Credit supply shock explains the least fraction of policy 











2.3.3 SEPARATING HOUSEHOLDS AND NON-
FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS 
Following the suggestion of Gambetti and Musso (2016) for further research, we 
decompose loans to household and non-financial firms separately in this subsection. 
First, we look at the ratio between these two. Note that the data that separates between 
loans for households and non-financial firms only started from first quarter of 2006 
for Malaysia, as provided by Bank for International Settlements, thus, we start our 
sample for this sub-analysis by following this date.  
Figure 2-6 shows the percentage of loans to households and loans to non-financial 
firms that makes up our data in the main model. The distribution is almost equal over 
the time presented, signifying the equal weight between these two. Thus, it is 
important to examine if the responses differ between households and businesses as 
both bring equal weight to the total loan studied. Different responses might signal for 
different approach or attention to the government to formulate policies. 
 


















































































































































Next, we look at the growth rate of households’ loans and non-financial firms’ loans. 
Figure 2-7 shows the growth rate for both, together with the total loan’s growth rate. 
Prior to the Global Financial Crisis, the high growth rate of total loan was attributed 
to the spike in the loan growth of non-financial firms.  
When the crisis hit, loan growth of non-financial firms reduces immediately to less 
than 1 per cent. Household loans, on the other hand, acted like a buffer and remained 
high during this period.  
As a result, the drop in total loans for private non-financial sectors was not as severe 
as in the other economies, especially in US, UK, and Euro Area as studied in Gambetti 
and Musso (2016).   
We plot the same graph for the US, UK, and Euro in Figure 2-8. The main difference 
in general with the graph for Malaysia is that the growth for household loans in these 
countries decreased along with NFC loans during the period of the crisis. As a result, 
the drop for overall loans to private non-financial corporations is drastic for these 3 
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Figure 2-7: Growth Rate of Households, Non-Financial Corporations, and Household Plus Non-
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Figure 2-8: Growth Rate of Households, Non-Financial Corporations, and Household plus Non-




We re-estimate the model by replacing total households and non-financial firms’ 
loans into these two components one by one. Duchi and Elbourne (2016) separated 
households and non-financial firms and replaced the GDP growth with respective 
contributions to GDP; namely consumption and investment for the Netherland data 
set. Thus, we replace the GDP growth with consumption growth for households’ 
model and investment growth for non-financial corporations’ model. For 
consumption growth, we take the final consumption expenditure and for investment, 
we take the gross capital formation as a proxy. Both data are taken from central bank 
of Malaysia. These additional series are adjusted for seasonality by using X-12 and 
the growth rate is calculated using year-on-year basis. 
2.3.3.1 HOUSEHOLDS 
 
First, we look at the household’s component of the total private non-financial firms’ 
credit. On impact, consumption growth increases by 8.5 per cent due to an 
expansionary household credit supply shock (that decreases lending rate by 0.1 per 
cent on impact) and the inflation increases by 3.8 per cent on impact. The positive 
response of consumption growth and inflation are both short lasting where it only lasts 
2 and 4 quarters, respectively. 
An expansionary household credit supply shock only resulted in a 1.4 per cent 
increase in household loan growth on impact and the positive response lasts for 3 
months. The negative response of lending rate due to an expansionary credit supply 
shocks is only significance on impact and from 8th to 12th quarter. Lastly, policy rate 
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Figure 2-9: Impulse Responses to an Expansionary Household Credit Supply Shock (Households 
Model) 
 
Then, we look at the variance decompositions of consumption growth and credit 
growth in the household credit model. Aggregate supply and aggregate demand 
shocks are the most significant contributors to the forecast variance of consumption 
growth. Credit supply shock explains 14 per cent while monetary policy shock only 
explains 10 per cent of the forecast variance of consumption growth on the 5th year. 
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Finally, it is interesting to the point that household’s credit supply shocks play 
minimal role in the forecast variance of household loan growth and it is contributed 
mainly by monetary policy shocks. On the 5th year, household credit supply shock 
only explains 9 per cent of the forecast variance of household loan growth, while 
monetary policy shock explains 26 per cent of it. 
 










2.3.3.2 NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS 
 
Investment growth increases by 13 per cent on impact to an expansionary NFC credit 
supply shocks that reduces the lending rate by 0.1 per cent on impact. Inflation also 
increases in response to the expansionary NFC credit supply shocks by 2.8 per cent 
on impact and lasts for 3 quarters.  
NFC loan growth increases by 11 per cent on impact due to an expansionary NFC 
credit supply shock and the positive response lasts for 6 quarters. Lending rate 
decreases significantly for 15 quarters, in which the largest impact is on the 6th quarter, 
where lending rate decreases by 0.14 per cent. 
Looking at the variance decomposition of investment growth in the NFC model, we 
could see that aggregate demand and supply shocks are still the main contributor to 
the forecast variance throughout 5 years. NFC credit supply shocks contribute 13 per 
cent of the forecast variance of investment growth in year 5. It is interesting to point 
that monetary policy shock explains higher fraction of forecast variance of investment 
growth than NFC credit supply shock. 
After 4 quarters, NFC credit supply shock explains 37 per cent of loan growth forecast 
variance, and the contribution become smaller as it decreases to 30 per cent after 5 
years but remains as the most important contributor. It followed by aggregate demand 
and aggregate supply shocks with 17 per cent each. Monetary policy shock is the 
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2.3.4 ROBUSTNESS  
We run our model with few adjustments to check the sensitivity of our main model. 
First, we change the sample size from 2000 as a starting point to January 2007, 
consistent with a year after the starting data point that separates households and non-
financial corporations’ loans. We have to take a year after the data availability as a 
starting point as we need to calculate the year-on-year growth. The impulse response 
results are reported in Appendix 2-D. The signs of the responses are generally the 
same. The duration of the responses of inflation and loan growth is a bit shorter for 
the sub-sample model. 
We also change the lending rate to credit spread following Mumtaz et al. (2018). The 
spread is calculated as average lending rate minus overnight rate. Results for GDP, 
inflation and loan growth are generally the same. As for interest rate spread, it was a 
negative response for 5 months and become insignificant. The response of monetary 
policy is longer than in the main model. The results are reported in Appendix 2-E. 
We also tried only partially identify the credit supply shock as in, we only identify 
credit supply shock and let other shocks unidentified. We report the results in 
Appendix 2-F. We found the same results generally as in the main model for the credit 
supply shocks.  
Overall, the benchmark model is robust against the results of other models described 
above. The general direction of the movement of the variables is mostly identical to 
what we obtained earlier. However, the magnitude and the duration of responses differ 





This chapter investigates the empirical significance of credit supply shock to the 
Malaysian economy within a structural VAR framework. The structural VAR 
framework has enabled us to study credit supply shock as a source of macroeconomic 
variation in Malaysia by making use of sign restrictions approach to identify the 
structural shocks. 
From the main impulse response results, we found that credit supply shock does have 
a substantial effect on output. An expansionary credit supply shock (normalized to 
decrease lending rate by 0.1 per cent) increases output by 2.2 per cent on impact. 
Credit supply shocks also cause loan growth to increase significantly by 4 per cent on 
impact. The variance decomposition analysis shows us that credit supply shocks does 
have significant contribution in influencing forecast variance of GDP growth, 
inflation, and especially credit growth. We also found that credit supply shock is more 
important in explaining forecast variance of credit growth, compared to monetary 
policy shock.  
Breaking down the total credit into households and non-financial firms, we found that 
both consumption and investment increases due to respective expansionary credit 
supply shocks. We also found few noticeable differences between the credit supply 
shocks of households and non-financial firms: 1) Response of lending rate in NFC 
model is significantly negative throughout the 20 quarters, while in household model, 
it is only significant from the 8th to 12th quarter. 2) 0.1 per cent decrease in lending 
rate due to credit supply shocks resulted in 11 per cent increase in the growth of NFC 
loans on impact, while it is only 1.2 per cent for households’ loan. 3) Variance 
decomposition analysis shows that credit supply shock is the most important shock to 
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explain forecast variance of credit growth for NFC, while for household model, the 
forecast variance of credit growth explained by credit supply shocks is much less 
important and it is mostly explained by monetary policy shocks. 
Overall, the results imply the importance of credit supply shock in influencing 
Malaysian economy. Credit supply shocks could be used as a tool to boost the 
economic growth in Malaysia when needed but must be threaded carefully as it comes 
with increasing inflation, and most importantly, higher level of debt in the economy. 
Policy makers in Malaysia could also choose which sector to boost separately, 
between households and non-financial firms, as both contribute to different 
components of GDP. The choice comes with different costs. Expansionary credit 
supply shocks to NFC increases more investment growth, but with the cost of higher 
level of debts in NFC. Expansionary credit supply shocks to households increases less 













2.5 APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2 
2.5.1 APPENDIX 2-A: DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS FOR MAIN MODEL 
 
 GDP CPI HOUSEHOLD+NFC LOAN RATE POLICY RATE 
 Mean  5.079916  2.252848  7.686787  6.068640  2.930137 
 Median  5.294731  1.945433  7.445303  5.690000  2.977728 
 Maximum  11.69644  8.399102  13.23632  7.903333  3.500000 
 Minimum -5.688069 -2.284752  0.000578  5.196667  2.000000 
 Std. Dev.  2.650035  1.415484  2.705345  0.726253  0.356087 
 Skewness -1.433227  0.924011  0.018726  0.612830 -0.474630 
 Kurtosis  7.367367  7.509357  2.856275  2.318794  3.552226 
      
 Jarque-Bera  86.41976  75.20669  0.069855  6.226571  3.819148 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.965676  0.044455  0.148143 
      
 Sum  386.0736  171.2165  584.1958  461.2167  222.6904 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  526.7015  150.2696  548.9169  39.55823  9.509856 
      
 Observations  76  76  76  76  76 

















2.5.2 APPENDIX 2-B: IMPULSE RESPONSE FOR 
MAIN MODEL 
 




2.5.3 APPENDIX 2-C: DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS FOR SUB-SAMPLE MODEL 
 
 
 GDP CPI 
HOUSEHOLDS 
+NFC HOUSEHOLDS NFC 
LOAN 
RATE POLICYRATE 
 Mean  4.890915  2.405605  8.788676  9.350092  8.325554  5.647917  2.995634 
 Median  5.167298  2.171489  8.658961  9.471852  8.189280  5.458333  2.991667 
 Maximum  10.36130  8.399102  13.23632  13.42020  17.06644  6.833333  3.500000 
 Minimum -5.688069 -2.284752  4.608263  5.041154  1.215965  5.196667  2.000000 
 Std. Dev.  2.659650  1.618292  2.387831  2.793259  4.025363  0.464093  0.393343 
 Skewness -2.089184  0.707104  0.110062 -0.151637  0.252682  1.496576 -1.145523 
 Kurtosis  9.161324  6.614368  2.193598  1.632850  2.485616  3.865115  4.122736 
        
 Jarque-Bera  110.8413  30.12728  1.397477  3.922149  1.039968  19.41476  13.01886 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.497212  0.140707  0.594530  0.000061  0.001489 
        
 Sum  234.7639  115.4690  421.8564  448.8044  399.6266  271.1000  143.7904 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev.  332.4658  123.0868  267.9817  366.7078  761.5667  10.12297  7.271796 
        
 Observations  48  48  48  48  48  48  48 



















2.5.4 APPENDIX 2-D: IMPULSE RESPONSE FOR 
SUB SAMPLE MODEL 
 
 




2.5.5 APPENDIX 2-E: IMPULSE RESPONSE FOR 
SPREAD MODEL 
 
Figure 2-18: Impulse Response for Spread Model 
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2.5.6APPENDIX 2-F: IMPULSE RESPONSE FOR 
PARTIAL IDENTIFICATION MODEL 
 




3 CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECTS 
OF US ECONOMIC POLICY 























Global Financial Crisis has reignited economists’ interest in a study of uncertainty. A 
more recent breakthrough from Baker et al. (2016) to quantify the economic policy 
uncertainty based on text search from newspapers has led to more studies on this 
subject matter, in which we use as a focus variable of this chapter. Economic policy 
uncertainty is defined as the inability of economic agents to predict the outcomes for 
regulatory, trade, fiscal, and, monetary policies (Kostka and van Roye, 2017).  
Increasing economic policy uncertainty was found to have an adverse impact on 
economic activity. Baker et al. (2016) show that economic policy uncertainty 
significantly impacts real economy in US. One example of the mechanism is if there 
is any uncertainty on a particular trade policy of one sector, investors in this sector 
may postpone their decisions on the investment until this uncertainty is dissolved. 
This brings down the production and ultimately leads to economic slowdown if the 
scale is massive.  
Although most studies would agree with the conclusion that economic policy 
uncertainty does affect the real economy negatively, there is still a further extension 
that would benefit from additional empirical investigations in this area of research, 
which is: its impact on small open developing economies. While there exists a strand 
of literature that examines the international transmission of external uncertainty 
shocks (Colombo, 2013; Cerda et al., 2017; Luk et al.,2017; and Stockhammar and 




In an economically integrated world, economic policy uncertainty in advanced 
foreign economies may have consequences for these vulnerable economies. This 
points to the motivation of this study. Given the characteristics of Malaysia as a small, 
open, and developing economy, it is crucial to see if economic policy uncertainty 
shocks originated from other advanced economy is affecting Malaysia. Moreover, 
Malaysia is highly dependent on its export and FDI. 
We hypothesize that US economic policy uncertainty could potentially affect 
Malaysian economy based on few reasonings. First, as US EPU Index is based on the 
articles reported in US newspapers, some of the articles could be reported in 
Malaysia’s newspaper as well. Especially if it concerns major economic news. 
Investors or other economic agents in Malaysia will probably react to the economic 
or policy uncertainty reported in the news, especially if it has direct consequences to 
them. Second, the possibility of transmission of uncertainty is higher if the two 
economies have a close link in trade. As of 2018, US is one of the most important 
trading partners for Malaysia with 13 per cent of the export goes to the US, and 7.4 
per cent import comes from US.   
Trade openness of Malaysia is also one of the highest in the world. Figure 3-1 shows 
the open economy characteristics of Malaysia. The trade percentage of GDP in 
Malaysia is constantly above 100 per cent since 1980’s. This shows how important 
external trade is to Malaysian economy and how vulnerable it is to any disturbances 





Figure 3-1 Trade Openness (Trade % of GDP) 
 
Understanding the distinct effects of each of the external shocks is an ever-present 
concern to policymakers in Malaysia. To illustrate, the strategy taken by the central 
bank to solve slower growth that caused by a pure external demand shock is perhaps 
more direct than to solve slower growth that was caused by a financial crisis 
originated from other advanced economies.  
Studies of how external factors influences domestic economy in Malaysia is well 
documented. For example, Chua et al. (1999); Ibrahim (2004); Tang (2006); 
Mackowiak, 2007; and Zaidi et al. (2014). Most of these studies focuses on the effects 
of external monetary policy shocks or income shocks. None of the available literature 
that specifically identify US EPU shock and study its impacts on domestic variables 
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The closest applications of EPU to any economic variables in Malaysia is only related 
to stock market. Sum (2013) examined the performance of stock market in ASEAN 
countries, including Malaysia, against the changes in US EPU. He found that increase 
in US EPU negatively affect the stock market in all ASEAN countries. Balcilar et al. 
(2019) uses Global EPU Index to analyse the causality to stock market in Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, and South Korea. They found evidence of causality from global EPU to 
stock return volatility in Malaysia. Lastly, Hoque and Zaidi (2018) specifically 
examined the effects of Global EPU on sectoral stock market in Malaysia. They found 
that Global EPU has significant effects on all sectoral stock returns in Malaysia. 
However, none of these studies specifically examine the effects on macroeconomics 
variables of Malaysia, such as output, price level, and interest rate. 
Addressing adverse effects arising from the specific external cause may help to 
formulate a better counter measure for Malaysian economy. However, formulating 
the right policies in response to specific external shocks requires a deep understanding 
of their effects on the economy and its transmission mechanisms. It is also essential 
to measure the relative impacts of different economic shocks as some might have 
higher relative importance than the others, thus requires more attention from the 
policymakers. 
This chapter aims to measure the effect of US economic policy uncertainty shocks, 
among other shocks from the US, to the Malaysian economy, focusing on output, 
price, and monetary policy. We then further include the other variables the examine 
the effects on financial stability. We adopt a Bayesian Structural Vector 
Autoregression (BSVAR) with Block Exogeneity approach and apply the sign and 
zero restrictions algorithm as per Arias et al. (2014) to identify the shocks.  
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We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we are the first to our knowledge to 
measure the effects of US EPU shock and compare it with other economic shocks in 
Malaysia. Second, we contribute to the literature by adding more evidence on the 
transmission effects of economic policy uncertainty from the US to a small, open, and 
especially developing economy.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we discuss the 
methodological framework and data. Section 3.3 presents the empirical results by 
focusing on sign restricted impulse responses function and forecast error variance 











In this section, we start the discussion by explaining the framework of SVAR with 
block exogeneity. Then we proceed with the identification scheme in which we use 
sign and zero restrictions. Next, we discuss the lag selection for our models. Lastly, 
we discuss the data included in our models. 
3.2.1 SVAR WITH BLOCK EXOGENEITY 
The discussion of the methodology starts with: 
𝐵0𝑌𝑡 = 𝑘 + 𝐵1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝑌𝑡−2+. . . +𝐵𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜑𝑡            (3-1) 
where 𝑌𝑡  is the matrix of endogenous variables, 𝜇𝑡  ∼  𝑁(0, 𝛴) is the reduced-form 
error terms, 𝑝 the lag length. 𝑘 is the matrix of constant terms. The reduced form VAR 
model obtained from (1) is 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐾 + 𝐴1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝑌𝑡−2+. . . +𝐴𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜇𝑡           (3-2) 
𝐸(𝜇𝑡𝜇𝑡
′ ) = 𝛴 = 𝐵0
−1𝐵0
−1′               (3-3) 
Where 𝛴 =  𝐸(𝜇𝑡𝜇𝑡′) is the n × n covariance matrix of the error term vector 𝜇𝑡. The 
error terms are the linearly unpredictable component of 𝑌𝑡,. 
With the purpose of implementing the block exogeneity assumption, we need to 
restrict both VAR coefficients and impact matrix 𝐵0. The impact matrix is restricted 




Beyond impact period, we can restrict the propagation of the Malaysian variables 
through the US block by restricting some parameters in the VAR. We can achieve 
this by assuming the appropriate prior distributions for parameters to be restricted 
within the Bayesian framework. We chose the Minnesota priors for this purpose as 
some other priors assumes that prior covariance of coefficients is proportional, in any 
two equations, to each other. 
In restricting the VAR parameters required for block exogeneity, first, in each 
equation of the US block, we assume zero mean priors with very small variance for 
all the Malaysia’s parameters. This enables us to assign the dominant weight to the 
prior parameters when computing the posterior. Applying this will ensure that the 
sample information is largely ignored as the coefficients’ posteriors will be mainly 
determined by the prior. To select the value of other hyperparameters, we utilise grid 
search approach and select the combination that maximizes marginal likelihood. We 
estimate our model using BEAR Toolbox by Dieppe et al. (2016) from European 
Central Bank. 
3.2.2 IDENTIFICATION SCHEME 
The identification scheme is done by imposing sign and zero restrictions on the 
impulse response function (IRF). For each draw of the posterior of reduced-form 
parameters, we compute a 𝑄 matrix, which is a uniformly distributed orthogonal 
matrix. Then, we multiply this 𝑄 matrix with the impact matrix 𝐵0.  
Arias et al. (2014) offers an algorithm that can produce an orthogonal 𝑄 such that 𝑄𝐵0 
will satisfy the zero restrictions at any horizons of the IRF. If the sign restrictions are 
satisfied, the posterior draw is accepted. If not, we repeat the procedure with a new 
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set of posterior draws of reduced-form parameters. The steps will be repeated until 
we reach determined number of iterations. 
We divide the structural shocks into two blocks: US and Malaysian block. Along with 
block exogeneity restrictions that we set on the VAR parameters; the Malaysian block 
is also separated from US blocks by assuming that Malaysian economic shocks do 
not influence US variables on impact.  
We identified four shocks for our baseline model: Aggregate Demand shock, 
Aggregate Supply shock, Monetary Policy shock, and US EPU shock. The restrictions 
for aggregate demand shock, aggregate supply shock, and monetary policy shock 
were chosen following the standard New Keynesian DSGE models and the 
restrictions are the same for both US and Malaysia. Specifically, we restricted positive 
aggregate demand shocks to increase output, the price level, and the policy rate. 
Aggregate supply shocks move output and price level in the opposite direction. 
Contractionary monetary policy shock increases the policy rate and decrease output 
and price level. 
We identify adverse US EPU shock as the shock that increases EPU, lowers the output 
and no contemporaneous impacts on monetary policy in US. The first economic 
reasoning for this restriction on the output is that higher policy uncertainty will affect 
household’s consumption and saving behaviour due to precautionary saving-motive. 
Because of an unexpected increase in policy uncertainty, households may increase 
precautionary saving, thereby reducing the means and desire to consume under 
normal circumstances. Moreover, Eberly (1994) also stated that higher uncertainty 
encourages households to postpone the decision to purchase durable goods due to its 
120 
 
nature which is costly to reverse. This further drives the aggregate demand to be 
lower, and thus, lowering the output level. 
The second reason for the restriction on the output is firms will delay or lower their 
investments when uncertainty increases. Higher economic policy uncertainty makes 
estimating the return on business decisions more difficult. Thus, investment risk 
premium will be higher, thus inducing firms to postpone or lower their investment, as 
shown in model with financial frictions (e.g., Gilchrist et al., 2014). Baker et. al. 
(2016) found that investment level in US dropped due to adverse EPU shock in US. 
Gulen and Ion (2016) also found a strong negative relationship between corporate 
investment and Economic Policy Uncertainty Index in US.   
The last reasoning concerns the labour market. Higher policy uncertainty could make 
firms to rethink about the fixed costs of hiring and firing. Leduc and Liu (2016) show 
how nominal rigidities can interact with labor market search frictions to amplify the 
negative effects of uncertainty in DSGE models. Baker et. al. (2016) found that 
employment level decreases due to adverse economic policy uncertainty shock in US. 
Caggiano et al. (2017), using non-linear VAR, also found that unemployment 
increases due to adverse EPU shock in US, especially during recession. Consequently, 
less employment will negatively affect the output via various channel (e.g., decrease 
in demand for consumption (Malley and Moutos, 1996)).  
We imposed the zero restrictions on the effect of the EPU shock on monetary policy 
on impact under the assumption that the policy makers in US have to wait for the EPU 
shock to be translated into changes in the price level or output first before responding. 




Responses of domestic variables to foreign shocks are left unrestricted. We aim to see 
how the US shocks affecting the Malaysian economy without imposing any 
restrictions on domestic variables. We summarise our identification scheme in Table 
3-1. 













IPI + + - ? ? ? ? 
CPI + - - ? ? ? ? 
IR + ? + ? ? ? ? 
USIPI 0 0 0 + + - - 
USCPI 0 0 0 + - ? - 
USEPU 0 0 0 ? ? + ? 
USIR 0 0 0 + ? 0 + 
Table 3-1: Identification Scheme 
 
 
3.2.3 LAG SELECTION 
Table 3-2 reports the lag length criteria results. We ran the lag length criteria tests for 
the data in the VAR part based on 5 different criteria: sequential modified LR test 
statistic: Final prediction error, Akaike information criterion, Schwarz information 
criterion, and Hannan-Quinn (HQ) information criterion. We follow the results and 
applies 2 lags in our estimation as given by Final prediction error, Akaike information 
criterion, and Hannan-Quinn (HQ) information criterion. Schwarz information 







Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 NA 12.35566 25.21713 25.38212 25.28417 
1 2169.668 3.15E-06 10.0344 11.51931* 10.63778 
2 216.4053 1.41e-06* 9.219310* 12.02413 10.35903* 
3 63.17509 2.05E-06 9.577316 13.70206 11.25338 
4 76.06572 2.61E-06 9.780928 15.22559 11.99333 
5 113.8688 2.24E-06 9.564294 16.32887 12.31304 
6 70.23774 2.86E-06 9.713839 17.79833 12.99892 
7 73.84428 3.43E-06 9.753943 19.15835 13.57536 
8 87.46435* 3.35E-06 9.535688 20.26001 13.89345 
Table 3-2: Results for Lag Selection Criteria 
*indicates lag order selected by the criterion. 
 
3.2.4 DATA 
We use monthly data from January 2000 to December 2018. The data contains 
domestic macroeconomics variables for Malaysia and the US.  
 Malaysian Variables 
1. Industrial Production Index: Seasonally adjusted, year-on-year 
growth. Data were taken from various issues of Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin from Central Bank of Malaysia. 
2. Consumer Price Index: Seasonally adjusted, year-on-year growth. 
Data were taken from Bank for International Settlements. 
3. Overnight Interbank Rate. No transformation. Data were taken from 
various issues of Monthly Statistical Bulletin from Central Bank of 
Malaysia. 
 US Variables 
1. Industrial Production Index: Year-on-year growth. Data were taken 
from Federal Reserve, Bank of St. Louis (FRED) and already been 
adjusted for seasonality. 
2. Consumer Price Index: Year-on-year growth. Data were taken from 
Federal Reserve, Bank of St. Louis (FRED) and already been adjusted 
for seasonality. 
3. 3-Month Treasury Bill: No transformation. Data were taken from 
Federal Reserve, Bank of St. Louis (FRED) 
4. News - based US Economic Policy Uncertainty Index: Log 





In this section, we present the results from our models for each macroeconomic 
variables of Malaysia. First, we present the impulse response of domestic variables to 
US economic policy uncertainties shocks. Next, we discuss the variance 
decompositions of domestic variables explained by all identified shocks. In addition 
to the conventional VAR variables that we analysed in the main model, we also added 
indicators for financial stability and economic expectations to see their responses to 
US EPU shocks. And lastly, we discuss the robustness tests for this study which 
includes analysis of the sub-sample, changing number of lags, applying alternative 
identification scheme, employing the full three components of US EPU Index, and 
relax the restrictions on other shocks (only identify the uncertainty shock).  
3.3.1 EFFECTS OF US ECONOMIC POLICY 
UNCERTAINTY SHOCKS ON DOMESTIC 
VARIABLES 
We start the analysis by looking at the results of the impulse response of domestic 
variables to 1 standard deviation US economic policy uncertainty shocks (or 0.05 
percentage increase in US EPU Index on impact for this main model). GDP growth 
decreases by 0.1 per cent on impact and decreases further to 0.4 per cent at its 
maximum response on the 4th month. This negative effect on the GDP growth lasted 
for 14 months before becoming insignificant. There is no immediate effect on 
inflation upon the impact, and the response only become significant after 15 months, 









Policy rate responded negatively upon the impact by 1 basis point and continue to 
decrease throughout the 24 months where it reaches -0.04 basis point. The summary 
for this subsection is, in response to the positive US EPU shocks, domestic output 
growth decreases immediately and significant, price level took some time to 
significantly responding in negative way, and monetary policy responded 
immediately by lowering the interest rate. 
3.3.2 RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF US 
ECONOMIC POLICY UNCERTAINTY 
SHOCKS 
From the results of the impulse response function, we are now clear about the signs 
of the responses of the domestic variables to US EPU shocks. Another question that 
we need to answer is, how important is the US EPU shocks compared to other external 
shocks from the US? 
To evaluate this relative importance of US EPU shocks compared to other shocks 
from the US, we compute the forecast error variance decomposition. Figure 3-5 shows 
the results for the variance decompositions of domestic variables to all identified 
shocks.  
US EPU shocks explained the most forecast variance of Malaysia’s output growth 
after 24 months horizon compared to other shocks from the US. EPU shocks 
contribute 9 per cent out of 22 per cent forecast variance of domestic IPI growth 
explained by all shocks from US at the end of the 24th month. Initially, for the first 
three months, the role of US EPU shock is almost insignificant, and US aggregate 
demand shock is dominating the contribution to overall US shocks. But after the third 
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month, we could see the increasing role of US EPU shocks in explaining the forecast 
variance of output growth. The contribution from US aggregate demand and supply 
shocks are almost similar in size at the end of the 24th month. And, the contribution 
of US monetary policy shocks is minimal to the forecast variance of output growth in 
Malaysia.  
41 per cent of the forecast variance of domestic inflation is explained by cumulated 
US shocks after 2 years. 14 per cent of it is explained by EPU shocks, 10 per cent by 
aggregate supply shock, 10 per cent by aggregate demand shock, and the rest by 
monetary shocks. We see the same pattern of increasing role of US EPU shocks in 
explaining domestic variable over time. US monetary shocks and US aggregate 
demand and supply shocks also show the same pattern of increasing contribution to 
the forecast variance of domestic inflation throughout the 24 months.  
Lastly, the forecast variance of short-term interest rate in Malaysia is mostly 
explained by US EPU shocks after 2 years. Out of 48 per cent variation explained by 
all US shocks, 36 per cent is from US EPU shocks.  
Overall, comparing US EPU shocks to other shocks from the US, US EPU shocks 
play more significant role than the rest in explaining forecast variance of domestic 
variables. We could also establish that EPU shock originated from US plays 
substantial role in affecting Malaysian economy in the long run, especially for 
domestic inflation and interest rate. Thus, Malaysian government should pay extra 




Figure 3-3: Forecast Error Variance Decompositions of Domestic Variables (Main Model) 
 
 
3.3.3 FINANCIAL STABILITY 
In addition to the standard macroeconomic variables that we examined in the base 
model; we also aim to see if economic policy uncertainty originated from the US 
could affect the financial stability in Malaysia.  
We utilise the Financial Stress Index to proxy financial stability in Malaysia. The data 
is taken from Asian Development Bank. Several studies have attempted to manually 
measure and study its impacts on the Malaysian economy such as Tng (2015), and 
Abdullah et al. (2017). Although there are some minor differences in methodology, 
the conclusion for these studies are almost similar; increasing Financial Stress Index 




The components of this index are; stress in the banking sector, stock market return, 
volatility in equity market, stress in debt markets, and exchange rate market 
pressure11. We plot the Financial Stress Index against Industrial Production growth in 
Figure 3-6.  
There is an almost clear inverse relationship between these two, especially during 
crises. In 2001 crisis, Financial Stress Index was high and accompanied by negative 
output growth. Same interaction occurred in the recent financial crisis; high financial 
stress index, negative output growth. During the period when the stress index is low 
and less volatile (e.g., September 2002-July 2004), the output growth was high.  
 
Figure 3-4: Financial Stress Index and Industrial Production Growth 
 
We plot the Financial Stress Index against US EPU in Figure 3-7.  The trend is 
visually apparent, especially before and during the recent financial crisis. Even after 
the crisis, when there are spikes on the US EPU, it will usually be followed by 
Financial Stress in Malaysia with few months lag (e.g., August 2011 in US EPU and 
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October 2011 in Malaysian Financial Stress, October 2013 in US EPU and January 
2014 in Malaysian Financial Stress). To simply make a conclusion just based on this 
visual inspection would be insufficient. Thus, we use our VAR model to test the 
relationship. 
 
Figure 3-5: Financial Stress Index and US EPU 
 
We include this variable in our VAR and assume some restrictions to uncover the 
shock. Adverse Financial stress shock is assumed to be increasing itself, lowering the 
output, and zero contemporaneous effect on monetary policy, as policymakers usually 
only notice the effect from this shock, to be translated to price changes, before 
responding. Figure 3-7 shows the impulse response for this model. We frame the 
individual impulse response function of interest on this figure, which is the response 
of Financial Stress Index to US EPU shocks 
1 standard deviation US EPU shocks (or US EPU shocks that increases US EPU Index 
by 0.06% on impact in this model) have no contemporaneous impact on domestic 
Financial Stress Index. But entering the first month after the shock, Financial Stress 
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by double after 3 months to 0.1 per cent increase in Financial Stress Index. The 
positive response lasts throughout the 24 months horizon. This answers the question 
of how US EPU shocks affect financial stability in Malaysia; negative (increasing the 
financial stress), significant and long-lasting.  
The impulse response results for financial stress model also confirms the findings 
from the literature on Financial Stress Index in Malaysia. Increase in financial stress 
lowers output, and as reported in Tng (2015), tend to reduce policy rate, suggesting 
the need for expansionary monetary policy to help counterbalance the contractionary 











Results from variance decompositions of the Financial Stress Index shows that after 
24 months, the most significant fraction of forecast variance explained by US shocks 
is contributed by US EPU shocks. This signifies an important transmission of adverse 
effect from US EPU shocks to financial stability in Malaysia. 
 
Figure 3-7: Forecast Error Variance Decompositions of Financial Stress Index (Financial 
Stability Model) 
 
3.3.4 LEADING INDICATOR 
Next, we aim to examine whether US EPU shock has any effects on the forward-
looking economic indicator of Malaysia. Department of Statistics Malaysia produces 
Leading Index on monthly basis as an indicator for the forward-looking of the 
economic condition of Malaysia, specifically, to monitor the Malaysian economic 
direction in an average of four to six months ahead.  
We plot the Log of Leading Index with the growth of Industrial Production in Figure 
3-9.  Just prior to the recent crisis, the Leading Index went down first before IPI 
growth, and during the crisis, Leading Index went upward first before the IPI growth 
to recover. This is also true during the recovery of 2001 crisis where Leading Index 
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went up first before the IPI growth. Given the predictive behaviour from visual 
inspection, it is interesting to see if this indicator could be affected by uncertainty 
shocks originated from US.  
 
Figure 3-8: Log of Leading Index and Industrial Production Growth 
 
We also plot the Leading Index against the US EPU. There are few episodes of a clear 
inverse relationship between US EPU and Leading Index that are noticeable by visual 
inspection, especially during the Global Financial Crisis. Following the exercise from 
the previous section, we also include this variable into our VAR as visual inspection 

















































































































































Figure 3-9: Log of Leading Index and US EPU 
 
We replace the Financial Stress Indicator with the log of Leading Index and not 
putting any sign restrictions for this additional shock. We leave it to be unidentified 
as we found no credible reference or assumption, for the sign or zero restrictions on 
this additional variable, to propose a credible shock. Nevertheless, our focus is to 
examine the effect of US EPU shocks on this additional variable (Leading Index), 
thus, not putting any additional restrictions for this new shock should not impair the 
results.   
The framed graph in Figure 3-10 is the one that we are interested in. It shows that 1 
standard deviation US EPU shock decreases Leading Index in Malaysia by 0.1 per 
cent on impact, and the response lasts for about 6 months. This result shows us that 
adverse US EPU shocks will decrease the forward-looking expectation of economic 































































































































































Among all the shocks originated from the US, US EPU shocks contributed the most 
substantial fraction of forecast variance of Leading Index, although, collectively, they 
only account for 21% at the end of year 2.  
 




We check the robustness of our results by running few sensitivity checks. We first 
check the results of the main model by using 1 lag in the VAR as suggested by SC in 
the lag length criteria. The results are reported in Appendix 3-A and they are robust 
to our main results.  
Then, we tried using only partial identification to identify US EPU shock while we 
set other external shocks to be unidentified and we also try to set all the domestic 
shocks to be unidentified. All sign and zero restrictions for the foreign variables, and 
zero restrictions on domestic variables will remain the same as in main model.  We 
report the results in Appendix 3-B for the first specification and Appendix 3-C for the 
second specification. The results of our main model are robust against these 




To ensure that our results are not biased to the identification scheme selected, we 
change the identification technique to Cholesky Decomposition. We order the 
variables as follow: {USIPI, USCPI, USIR, USEPU, IPI, CPI, IR} following the order 
of the variables from Stockhammar and Osterholm (2017). We still imposed the block 
exogeneity restrictions on the VAR parameters here. The results are reported in 
Appendix 3-D. Response of CPI is negative and long lasting. This is quite different 
than the one we obtained in our main model, where the response is insignificant on 
the CPI. Monetary policy rate response is the same as in baseline model. The negative 
response of IPI growth on the other hand, only significant from the 2nd until 6th month 
after the impact of US EPU shocks. 
Finally, we replace the news based EPU index with the Three Components EPU Index 
instead news based that we used in the main model and report the results in Appendix 
3-E. The three components EPU index consists of news-based EPU, Tax code 
expiration, and economic forecaster disagreement12. We found that our main results 





                                                             




In this chapter, we employ a Bayesian SVAR with block exogeneity to study the 
impact of external shocks from the US on the Malaysian economy. Unlike previous 
studies of external shocks in Malaysia, we utilise Economic Policy Uncertainty Index 
developed by Baker et al. (2016) to study the effect of US economic policy uncertainty 
shocks on Malaysian economy. We identified 3 domestic and 4 US economic shocks 
by applying sign and zero restrictions by Arias et al. (2014) in our main model. 
From the impulse response analysis, we found that Industrial Production growth 
respond negatively to US economic policy uncertainty shocks and lasts for 1 year and 
a half. The response of domestic inflation to US EPU shock is negative but not 
significant. Lastly, response of monetary policy rate to external EPU shock is 
negative, significant, and long-lasting. These findings suggest that economic policy 
uncertainty shocks originated from US do affect Malaysian economy negatively. Our 
results from forecast error variance decompositions, in general, suggest that US EPU 
shock is substantially important in relative to other shocks originated from US.  
Lastly, additional exercises of adding Financial Stress Index and Leading Index for 
Malaysia further shows that US EPU shocks harming financial stability and lower the 
expectations of future economic performance of Malaysia. 
These findings are beneficial for the policymakers in Malaysia to be aware of the US 
economic policy uncertainty and to formulate countermeasures in the case of high 
uncertainty as it is evidenced in this chapter that the effect is substantially important 
in affecting Malaysian economy. 
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3.5 APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3 
3.5.1 APPENDIX 3-A: MAIN MODEL WITH 1 
LAG 
 




3.5.2 APPENDIX 3-B: PARTIAL 
IDENTIFICATION OF EPU SHOCK (US 
SHOCKS UNIDENTIFIED, DOMESTIC 
SHOCKS IDENTIFIED) 
 
Figure 3-13: Impulse Response Functions of Domestic Variables to All US Shocks (US Shocks 




3.5.3 APPENDIX 3-C: PARTIAL 
IDENTIFICATION OF EPU SHOCK (US AND 
DOMESTIC SHOCKS UNIDENTIFIED) 
 
Figure 3-14: Impulse Response Functions of Domestic Variables to All US Shocks (US and 




3.5.4 APPENDIX 3-D: CHOLESKY 
DECOMPOSITION  
 






3.5.5 APPENDIX 3-E: THREE COMPONENTS US 
EPU 
 
Figure 3-16: Impulse Response Functions of Domestic Variables to All US Shocks (Three 
Components US EPU) 
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4 DIRECTION FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
In chapter one, we have utilised the data-rich methodology namely FAVAR to study 
the monetary policy shocks across sectors. The results are in accordance with 
economics theories except for exchange rate puzzle that presents in the main model. 
Adding 1 additional US variable, which is US interest rate, eliminating the puzzle. 
This signifies the importance of foreign variables in modelling Malaysian 
macroeconomics. Further analysis could incorporate more foreign variables into an 
open economy FAVAR as in Mumtaz and Surico (2009) and utilising sign restrictions 
for the shock’s identifications.  
Recent advancement in macro-econometrics has seen the rise of the time-varying 
approach in estimating VAR. Given the massive changes in the economic structure 
around the globe for the past few decades, this approach is very interesting to apply. 
Given the short data availability in or analysis for chapter 2 and 3, we could not apply 
this methodology. But perhaps, in the future, where the data availability is longer, one 
could apply this approach to revalidate the results. 
In the third chapter, we only focus on US EPU shock in influencing Malaysian 
economy. As Malaysia is closely linked to other members of ASEAN and benefitting 
from its free trade agreement, it will be interesting to incorporate this regional factor 
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